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THERE IS A PERSISTENT  divergence  between the widespread  views of the 
virtues  of capitalism  and  the models  we use tojustify  those beliefs. While 
it is the dynamic  properties  of capitalism,  the increases  in the standards 
of living to which it has given rise, that constitute the basis of our 
confidence  in its superiority  to other forms of economic organization, 
the theory-at  least the version we teach to students-is  based on a 
model  that  assumes an unchanging  technology. 
This divergence  is disturbing,  and  not only because of the intellectual 
dissonance to which it should give rise. Views concerning  important 
policy issues are frequently  based on simplistic models, regardless  of 
how inappropriate  those models  are. For instance,  considerations  of the 
need  for and  consequences  of antitrust  policies, including  policies aimed 
at restricting  vertical restraints  of trade, are frequently  based on the 
standard  competitive  paradigm.  In that  context it is argued,  for instance, 
that producers  would impose vertical restraints  only if the restraints 
enhanced efficiency. Yet markets in which technological change is 
important  are never perfectly  competitive, and in imperfectly  competi- 
tive markets,  vertical restraints  may also serve to alter the degree of 
competition.  1 
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Richard  McMasters,  Hal Varian,  and the participants  at the Brookings  Conference  for 
their  helpful  comments.  This  paper  is based  on research  supported  by the  National  Science 
Foundation,  the Olin  Foundation,  and  the Hoover  Institution,  Stanford. 
1. In monopoly  markets, vertical restraints  could be adopted either because they 
enhance  efficiency  or because  they enhance  the ability  of the monopolist  to discriminate 
in pricing.  Studying  the polar  cases of monopoly  and competition  may thus not provide 
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In Capitalism, Socialismn,  and Democracy,  Joseph Schumpeter long 
ago argued  that any analysis of capitalism  must be based on models in 
which  there  is technological  change,  in  which  competition  takes  the  form 
of developing  new products  and  processes rather  than, or in addition  to, 
the price  competition  that  is the subject  of concern  in conventional  price 
theory. He argued  that markets  with technological  change were inher- 
ently imperfectly  competitive. But while Schumpeter  recognized the 
relative  unimportance  of price  competition,  he did not fully explain  it. 
There are a number of reasons why the conventional theory of 
competition does not describe well the industrial sectors in which 
technological change is  important, among them that technological 
change inherently entails an element of increasing returns and that 
expenditures  on R&D  are, for the most part,  sunk  costs. 
As has long been recognized, when there are increasing returns, 
competition  may not be viable: both market  equilibrium  and economic 
efficiency entail one firm, or at most a few. In recent years, however, 
arguments  have been put forward  that even markets  in which there are 
a limited  number  of competitors  may behave competitively  because of 
the discipline  provided  by potential  competition.  This  argument  is called 
the contestability  doctrine.2  Industries  with increasing  returns  will have 
one firm  operating-as efficiency  requires.  And that  firm  operates  at the 
highest  output  at which  price  equals  average  costs-that  is, where  profits 
are zero (figure  1). If the monopolist  operated  at a lower level of output, 
with a price higher than average cost, an entrant would contest the 
market,  entering  with a lower price and stealing  all the customers  away 
from  the incumbent  firm. 
insights into the more prevalent  case of imperfect  competition,  where such practices 
attempt  to change  the extent of competition.  For further  discussion  of the role of vertical 
restraints  in altering  the degree  of competition,  see P. Rey and Joseph  E. Stiglitz, "The 
Role of Exclusive  Territories  in Producers'  Competition,"  unpublished  paper  (1987);  and 
Rey and Stiglitz,  "Imperfect  Competition  and Vertical  Restraints,"  European  Economic 
Review  (forthcoming). 
2. There are clearly antecedents of this view in the "Chicago School"; see, for 
example, Harold  Demsetz, "Why Regulate  Utilities," Journal  of Law and Economics, 
vol. 11 (April 1968), pp. 55-66. Its most ardent  current  advocates include Sanford  J. 
Grossman,  "Nash Equilibrium  and the Industrial  Organization  of Markets  with Large 
Fixed Costs," Econometrica,  vol. 49 (September  1981),  pp. 1149-72;  William  J. Baumol, 
"Contestable  Markets:  An Uprising  in the Theory of Industrial  Structure,"  American 
Economic  Review, vol. 72 (March 1982),  pp. 1-15; and Baumol, John C. Panzer, and 
Robert D.  Willig, Contestable  Markets and the Thleomy  of Indlistry Stulctullre  (Harcourt 
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Figure 1.  Equilibrium in Contestable Markets 
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If the contestability  doctrine  were correct,  it would  radically  alter  our 
attitudes  toward  antitrust  policy. It would imply  that  an important  class 
of circumstances-those  in which there was a natural  monopoly (or 
oligopoly) because of increasing  returns-which  previously had been 
thought  to give rise to market  failure  (Pareto  inefficiencies),  need not or 
would not do so. Government  intervention,  if this view were correct, 
would  not  be required,  even when there  was only one firm  or a few firms. 
And  indeed,  the typical  form  of government  intervention,  which entails 
breaking  up firms or limiting  their agglomeration,  could be positively 
harmful,  since the potential economies of scale would not be fully 
exploited. 
While  traditional  economic analysis argued  that in the presence of 
increasing  returns  there  was a trade-off  between having  many  firms  with 
less monopoly  power but a loss in productive  efficiency or a few firms 
with  more  power  and  more  efficiency,  the contestability  doctrine  claims 
there  is no trade-off. 
For countries  concerned  about their technological  leadership,  these 
issues are of particular  importance.  When  the technological  change  is a 
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increasing  returns  and a high  degree  of concentration  of market  power. 
If potential competititon  suffices to ensure not only that the industry 
behaves in an efficient  manner  but that the efficiency gains are passed 
along to consumers,  then government  intervention  to break  up or limit 
the size of those firms  that have gained  their  dominant  position through 
technological  advances  may seem particularly  inadvisable. 
The purpose  of this paper  is to address the validity or generality  of 
the premise that potential competition suffices to ensure economic 
efficiency. It is a paper as much about the models used to justify our 
beliefs about the design of economic policy as it is about what those 
policies should  be. The  latter  is a far  more  difficult  question,  about  which 
I have a few observations  in the concluding  section. 
More  precisely,  I contend  that  the traditional  arguments  against such 
government  policies to open up competition as antitrust  regulations, 
regulations  for fair trade practices, and so forth are at best of limited 
validity and relevance in most sectors of modern economies. These 
arguments  hold that 
-competition  ensures efficiency, and the gains from technological 
change  are  passed along  to consumers  through  low prices;  and 
-profits  attract  entry, ensuring  that markets  must behave competi- 
tively. 
The contestability  doctrine emphasizes that to assess the force of 
competition,  one should  not look at the number  of existing firms  but at 
potential  entrants,  and in most instances there are many of these. But 
just as with Bertrand  (cutthroat)  competition  among  firms  in a market, 
in which it takes only two firms  to obtain  competitive solutions, so, the 
doctrine argues, it takes only one potential entrant, or at most a few 
entrants,  to ensure  both economic efficiency  and zero profits. 
By contrast, I argue that these results are highly sensitive to the 
assumption  of zero sunk  costs. With  sunk  costs, even very small  ones, I 
argue: 
-The  existence of profits  may not attract  entry. Potential  entrants 
will make a judgment about what will happen after they enter, and 
positive profits  for  the incumbent  monopolist  may  entail  negative  profits 
for an entrant who attempts to contest that market. Thus potential 
competition  does not suffice. 
-Entry  may not entail competition.  The entrant  or entrants  and the 
incumbent  firm may collude rather  than compete. (And the collusion 
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of what is in its self-interest.)  Alternatively,  entry may simply lead to 
one or another  firm's  exit-but  not to competition. 
-Incumbent firms  will take action to deter entry;  entering  firms  will 
take action to facilitate  collusion. Among  these actions is the choice of 
technology, including  the decision about whether to use technologies 
that entail  large sunk costs. Some of the entry-deterring  and collusion- 
facilitating  actions  reduce  social  welfare.  Thus  the fact that  there  is some 
competition  or potential  competition  should  not be taken  as prima  facie 
evidence that  some action  undertaken  by a firm  enhances  efficiency. 
-Even  when competition  is successful in reducing  profits to zero, 
efficiency is not ensured. The kind of competition  with which we are 
concerned  here does not ensure that price equals marginal  cost: there 
may be "rents" associated with being the first firm  to produce a new 
product.  But competition  to be the first firm  may be sufficiently  fierce 
that  those rents  are largely  dissipated.  Competition  for those rents may 
give capitalism  its essential dynamism  but need not lead to efficiency  in 
the standard  Paretian  sense. 
Because technological  change  inherently  involves increasing  returns 
and  sunk  costs, the contestability  doctrine  is particularly  inapplicable  to 
industries  in which technological  change  is important;  potential  compe- 
tition  ensures  neither  economic efficiency  nor zero profits. 
The paper  is divided into five parts. In the next part, I argue in the 
context of a static model that potential competition  will not suffice to 
ensure  economic efficiency when there are even small sunk costs, and 
that  sunk  costs are in fact pervasive. The subsequent  section considers 
several  important  objections that have been raised to this argument.  I 
show that they are either not valid or that they strengthen  the concern 
about the limited efficacy of potential competition. I then extend the 
analysis  to the problems  of sunk costs associated with innovation.  The 
paper  concludes  with some brief  remarks  concerning  the interpretation 
of the results  for economic  policy. 
Sunk Costs and Potential Competition 
A major  insight  of the work on industrial  organization  over the past 
decade is that what matters  for entry and the nature  of competition  is 
how firms  will interact  should  entry  occur, or-since  these are  generally 
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interactions.3  An incumbent  firm's prices may be high today, but that 
does not  necessarily  result  in entry  if potential  entrants  believe that  entry 
will result in fierce competition and lower prices. There is thus an 
intimate  connection between ex ante competition, competition  before 
entry, and ex post competition, the nature  of competition  after entry. 
Indeed,  the possibility  of excessively fierce  ex post competition  actually 
reduces the effectiveness of ex ante competition. The variables that 
determine  the nature  of ex post competition,  or  potential  entrants'  beliefs 
about  the nature  of ex post competition,  are called state variables. 
To examine  these questions, I assume  there  is initially  a single  firm  in 
the industry.  I then  divide  the analysis  into two stages:  equilibriunm  after 
entry  (should  entry occur) and actions taken before entry, which affect 
the likelihood  of entry  and  the equilibrium  should  entry  occur. There  are 
three possible responses to entry: the firms can compete; they can 
collude, sharing  the monopoly  profits;  or the incumbent  firm  may exit. 
Competition  in turn can take on a number  of different  forms-there  is 
no agreed-upon  theory of competition among duopolists. I focus on 
Bertrand  (price)  competition,  because the concern  here is to show that, 
even under the seemingly most favorable conditions where it is ex- 
tremely  effective in driving  down prices, competition  does not ensure 
either  zero profits  or economic  efficiency.  Later  in the paper  I show how 
the results  are fnodified  when ex post competition  is less effective. 
Thus one needs to ascertain  the circumstances  under  which compe- 
tition, collusion, and exit will occur. And this is precisely the same 
question  facing the incumbent  firm.  It wants to take actions in the first 
stage  that  make  the world  most unattractive  for any potential  entrant.  It 
seeks to deter  entry.  It tries  to convince  potential  rivals  that, should  they 
enter, there  will not be accommodation  through  collusion and a sharing 
of profits  but war-sufficiently fierce competition  that the entrant  will 
regret  its decision. Figure  2 shows the timing-decision  structure. 
3. Among  the  early  contributors  were  Steven  C. Salop, "Strategic  Entry  Deterrence," 
Americani Economic  Rev,iew, vol. 69 (May 1979, Papers  and Proceedings,  1978), pp. 
335-38;  Avinash  Dixit, "The  Role  of Investment  in  Entry  Deterrence,"  Eco,ioinic Joiurntial, 
vol. 90 (March  1980),  pp. 95-106;  A. Michael  Spence, "Entry,  Capacity,  Investment,  and 
Oligopolistic  Pricing,"  Bell Journal  of Economtiics, vol. 8 (Autumn  1977), pp. 534-44; 
Richard  Gilbert and Joseph E.  Stiglitz, "Entry, Equilibrium,  and Welfare," paper 
presented  to the NBER-NSF Conference  on Industrial  Organization,  Toronto, October 
1978;  and Stiglitz, "Potential  Competition  May Reduce Welfare,"  Amtierican  Econonmic 
ReOiew, vol. 71 (May 1981,  Papers amid  Pmoceedings, 1980), pp. 184-89. Joseph  E. Stiglitz  889 
Figure 2.  Time-Decision Structure for Basic Model 
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I began  this section by arguing  that a major  insight  of recent work in 
industrial  organization  was that what mattered  for entry  was the nature 
of competition  after entry, and that was determined  by state variables, 
such as binding  commitments  and irreversible  investments. Expendi- 
tures on sunk costs-costs  that once expended cannot be recovered- 
are state variables and have, as we  shall see,  a critical effect on 
competition. 
Investment  expenditures  need not be completely sunk. Because an 
airplane  purchased  by one firm can easily be resold to another, an 
investment  in an airplane  is not sunk. By the same token the number  of 
airplanes  an airline  owns should  not be viewed as a state variable.  While 
much  of investment  is not sunk, however, there is a sunk cost element 
in  almost  all  investments.  An airline  must  advertise  to obtain  customers; 
it must  solve complicated  routing  problems.  It is therefore  important  to 
ascertain  the nature  of the competitive  interactions  that  arise  when  there 
are  sunk  costs, particularly  when there  are small  sunk  costs. 
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competition  even small  sunk  costs act as effective entry  barriers.  There 
are  two ways in which  sunk  costs can be small:  they may  be small  relative 
to marginal  production  costs or they may not be very sunk-a  short- 
lived, irrecoverable  investment  is, it would seem, not very sunk. Even 
when sunk  costs are small  in either  sense, potential  competition  may  not 
be effective. 
SMALL  SUNK  COSTS  CAN  CREATE  COMPLETE  ENTRY  BARRIERS 
Assume two firms, labeled 1 and 2. If a,  and a2 are the actions 
taken by them, respectively, their profits  are denoted by n  Ir(a1,  a2)  and 
1T2(a1,  a2). The firms  are engaged in a noncooperative  game. Suppose 
that (a*, a*) is the unique equilibrium  point of the game and that 
,Tr(a*, a*) =  Tr2(a*,  a*) =  0, that is, equilibrium profits are zero. 
Next assume  that  firm  2 can undertake  a passive action, not entering 
the market,  which is denoted  by a2. The best response by firm 1 to a2  is 
al,. Assume that al(al, a2)  >  0, that  'U2(a  1, a2) =  0, and  finally  that  there 
is no action  available  to firm  2 such that  'U2(a  I, a2)  >  0. That  is, if the first 
firm  takes action  al, then a2  is the best response  for firm  2. 
Now embed  this game in a larger  game. Begin by regarding  firm 1 as 
the incumbent  and firm 2 the potential entrant. If firm 2 enters, the 
subsequent game played by the firms is the one above. But it costs 
E ( >  0) to enter, and this cost, one assumes, has to be sunk. Assume 
finally  that if firm  2 does not enter, it is restricted  to the passive action 
a2. One can now easily confirm 
proposition  1: If E >  0, there is a unique, subgame-perfect  equilibrium 
in which firm 2 does not enter and firm 1 chooses al,  thus earning 
-l(a1, a2)  >  0. If E = 0, there  are  two equilibria:  one is the pair  of actions 
(a*, a*) at which the firms  earn  no profits;  the other  is the equilibrium  in 
which firm  2 does not enter  and  firm  1 chooses aI.4 
The argument  is straightforward.  If entry occurs, by assumption  the 
profits  of the entrant  in the postentry  period  are zero. But to enter, firm 
2 encounters  a cost of e; its total profits  from entering  are thus - E.  If it 
does not enter, its profits  are zero. It is better  for it not to enter. 
4. Note that the second firm  is indifferent  to choosing  between these two equilibria, 
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Proposition  1  is disturbing  because it says that  even a negligible  entry 
cost can fully cushion  the incumbent  against  encroachment.  As long as 
E is positive, it is of little significance  whether a potential entrant is 
waiting  in the wings. Notice as well that the proposition  does not deny 
that the incumbent  firm  may itself have had to incur  a sunk cost of E to 
enter  in the first  instance. As long as firm  1 had the first  move, it would 
enter, provided  E was not too large, and as proposition  1 asserts, firm  2 
would  not find  it profitable  to enter. 
This discussion has deliberately  left the actions of the firms  uninter- 
preted in economic terms. The actions may include signing  contracts 
with customers  to supply  commodities.  Provided  costs have to be sunk 
to enter the competition, proposition 1 stands intact. The following 
discussion  provides  a specific  economic example  of proposition  1. 
Consider  a market  for a homogeneous  product.  The market  demand 
curve slopes downward  and the unit cost of production  is a constant 
C -  0. Firms 1 and 2 compete in the way suggested  by Bertrand.  Each 
takes the other's price as given. Bertrand  competition  implies  cutthroat 
behavior  by firms,  with price being driven  to marginal  costs, C. I focus 
on it not only because it may describe competition  in certain markets 
well-the  recent models of contestable  markets  assume that such fierce 
competition  is empirically  important-but also as I suggested earlier, 
Bertrand  competition provides, one  might have thought, the most 
favorable  circumstances  for the doctrine  that competition  ensures effi- 
ciency and  zero profits. 
Now suppose that entry into the industry  requires  a cost E >  0 to be 
sunk,  and  firms  1  and  2 move sequentially  as regards  entry. Let Tr  denote 
monopoly  profits  in this industry  exclusive of entry  costs. It is then easy 
to confirm 
proposition 2: If  0 <  E <TF, there  is a unique,  subgame-perfect  equilibrium 
in which  only firm  1  enters and  it earns n -  E as net profit.5 
5. For notational  simplicity  I am supposing  that the interest  rate is zero. If the firms 
move  simultaneously  in  a two-stage  game  in which  entry  precedes  price  competition,  there 
are  three  subgame-perfect  equilibria:  1  enters  and  2 does not (as in proposition  2);  2 enters 
and 1  does not;  and  a symmetric  mixed-strategy  equilibrium  (where  each firm  enters  with 
probability  p) in which  the expected  profit  of each firm  is zero. Such  symmetric  outcomes 
are ignored  in the text because I wish to explore the effect of potential  entrants  on an 
incumbent's  behavior  and  hence  on the eventual  industrial  structure. 
Only  the asymmetric  equilibria  are productively  efficient.  There  is a probability  of p2 892  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Notice again  that even if E is small, firm  2 poses no threat  to firm 1; 
the outcome is as though  there  is no potential  competition.  The result  is 
disturbing  because  the technology  that  I have postulated  differs  insignif- 
icantly  from  the standard  assumption  of constant  returns  to scale. There 
is a slight  element  of increasing  returns,  caused by the small  sunk  costs. 
Contestability suggests that, while even  with this small degree of 
increasing  returns  there will be only one firm  operating  in the market, 
price should be just slightly  above marginal  cost; my analysis suggests 
that  price should  be equal  to the monopoly  price. 
What are the policy implications?  Any policy that gets the entrant 
into the industry  may  improve  social welfare.  Two such policies suggest 
themselves. One is to  subsidize entry. In this case the traditional 
argument  against  such subsidies-that if it is socially desirable  to enter, 
it must  be privately  desirable,  and therefore  subsidies  are not needed- 
is simply  incorrect.  The  entrant  forces the market  price  down  to marginal 
costs, but  consumers  capture  social gains. 
A second policy is minimum-price  legislation (retail price mainte- 
nance). Let D(q) denote market  demand  at price q. Now let 
(1)  q =  C +  [2E/D(q)] 
(see figure  3). It is then an easy matter  to confirm 
proposition 3: If the government  sets a minimum  price slightly  above q, 
there  is a unique,  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  in which  both  firms  enter 
and charge  the minimum  allowable  price. 
The idea behind  this policy is simple  enough. Even a small  entry  cost 
provides  complete  protection  to the incumbent  in proposition  2 because 
the model envisages cutthroat  competition  should both firms  enter. In 
proposition  3 the government  prohibits  cutthroat  competition  to allow 
firms  to earn  some profits  should  both enter, thus making  it profitable  to 
enter. Notice as well in equation  1  that  q is only slightly  in excess of C if 
E is small. Thus if entry cost is small, the minimum-price  legislation 
identified  in proposition  3 sustains  a nearly  efficient  outcome. 
I am not convinced that there are many circumstances  in which this 
that there  will be duplication  of the sunk  costs, and a probability  of (1 -  p)2  that  no firm 
enters. Of course, the asymmetric  equilibria  are inefficient  in that  price  exceeds marginal 
costs. Even with a simple  criterion,  such as the sum of consumer  plus producer  surplus, 
the overall  welfare  comparisons  are not obvious:  they depend  on the magnitude  of sunk 
costs and  consumer  surplus. Joseph  E. Stiglitz  893 
Figure 3.  Retail Price Maintenance 
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model  provides  a rationale  for  retail  price  maintenance,  partly  for  reasons 
given later  in this paper.  Nor, because of the difficulties  of determining 
the circumstances  in which these policies would increase  welfare, am I 
convinced  that  either  of the two policies is generally  desirable.6 
Still, the analysis of this section should serve as a warning.  If such a 
slight  modification  of the standard  technological  assumptions  underlying 
analyses of competition  leads to such a radical  change in both market 
equilibrium  and  the desirability  of government  intervention,  can  we have 
confidence  in  policies  derived  from  these analyses,  and  more  particularly 
from  the more  recent variants  based on the contestability  doctrine? 
6. Were  these  accepted  as legitimate  arguments  for entry  subsidies,  potential  entrants 
to a market  would  argue  that  such circumstances  apply  to them. Similarly,  if the policies 
were  accepted  as legitimate  arguments  for retail  price  maintenance,  firms  in the industry 
would argue  that theirs were precisely the circumstances  under which, without  RPM, 
there  would  be destructive  competition.  In the circumstances  in which  these policies  were 
truly  appropriate,  there  would  be no rents  (profits)  even with these government  policies, 
and  hence  no rent-seeking  activity. 
Of  the two policies,  the subsidy  has the advantage  that  it requires  a one-time  action  by 
the government,  not long-run  regulation.  The effectiveness  of the RPM  policy hinges  on 
the government's  knowing  the demand  function  and the technology  (the value of sunk 
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SUNK  COSTS,  DURABILITY,  AND  NATURAL  MONOPOLY 
The essential  feature  of sunk  costs is that  they represent  expenditures 
that cannot be recovered. They frequently  represent  expenditures  on 
nontransportable,  nonconvertible  plant  and equipment,  such as the site 
preparation  work for a nuclear power plant. But even in the best of 
circumstances  the  plant  and  equipment  are  of finite  duration;  the planned 
life of a plant may be only thirty or fifty years. There is a natural 
connection  between  durability  and  sunk  costs. If  a machine  was designed 
to last only five minutes, expenditures  on it would not be considered 
investment  and  would  not typically  be viewed as representing  significant 
sunk  costs. 
The previous sections showed how the presence of even an epsilon 
(E) sunk  cost could  alter  the equilibrium  in a significant  way. This section 
reinforces  that  conclusion  by considering  what  happens  as the durability 
of a machine  goes to zero-again,  there are negligible  sunk costs. But 
while in the previous section potential  competition  had no effects, this 
section shows that  although  consumers  are  not benefited-prices remain 
at the monopoly level-profits  are decreased: potential competition 
represents  a Pareto  worsening  of welfare. 
I investigate these questions in the context of a natural  monopoly, 
one in which efficiency  considerations  dictate that there should  be only 
one firm  producing.  Natural  monopolies  have always been at the center 
of discussions on economic regulation.  Recall the earlier  discussion of 
the contestability  doctrine, which holds that with a natural  monopoly 
(decreasing  average costs), price will be set equal to the average cost 
and  government  regulation  will  be unnecessary.7  My analysis  shows that 
conclusion  is not valid so long as there  are any durable  sunk  costs. 
7.  It is further  argued  that  if the natural  monopolist  produces  several  commodities,  it 
will use Ramsey  prices,  just as the government  would.  Though  the monopolist  will indeed 
not simply set marginal  revenue equal to marginal  cost (as in the simpler theory of 
monopoly),  and the prices  it charges  will have a superficial  semblance  to Ramsey  prices, 
in general  the prices will not be the same as those that a government  agency running  the 
firm  and maximizing  social welfare  would set. For an example of what is at issue, see 
David  E. Sappington  and  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Information  and  Regulation,"  in Elizabeth 
E. Bailey, ed., Public Regulation: New Perspectives  on Institutions and Policies  (London: 
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Consider  the market  for a homogeneous  commodity  facing  a demand 
function q(Q), where Q is the flow of output at any date and q the 
corresponding  market-clearing  price. In order to produce, facilities 
costing F  have to be constructed. The lifetime of such facilities is 
precisely T years, and they depreciate  all at once in year T. Once such 
facilities  are installed,  the commodity  can be produced  at marginal  cost 
C (?  0). There are therefore  no capacity limits. Let r (> 0) denote the 
rate  of interest.  For convenience  let time  be continuous.  Firm  revenues, 
R, net of variable  costs are then 
(2)  R(Q)  q(Q)Q -  CQ.8 
Let Qm  maximize  R(Q); Qm  is the output  a monopolist  would  produce 
if there were no potential  entrant  in the industry.  The technology and 
demand  curves are such that one, but only one, firm  can earn enough 
over time  to cover the fixed cost of entry.9 
If one assumes that F represents  fixed costs that are not sunk, then 
the theory  of contestable  markets  asserts that if the market  in question 
is contestable,  the threat  of potential  entry  forces prices down to a level 
at which profits are zero-that  is,  the present discounted value of 
revenues  net of variable  costs is  just equal  to the fixed costs, with a new 
facility being built every T years. The contestable output, Qc, is given 
by the solution  of the zero-profit  condition: 
(3)  R(QC) =  rF/(1  -  e-). 
It is clear that Qc >  Qm,  that contestable output exceeds monopoly 
output. 
Suppose  now that  F represents  sunk  costs. Assume that  once produc- 
tion  facilities  have been constructed,  there  is Bertrand  competition,  and 
the equilibrium  price of the product  equals the marginal  cost of produc- 
tion, C. If there  is a potential  entrant,  the incumbent  firm  will deter  entry 
not by raising  output  to Qc  but  by constructing  production  facilities  with 
greater  frequency  than  T. 
The incumbent  sinks F  at T =  0. The rival firm will achieve no 
8. I assume  that  R(Q)  is concave in Q. In the more  general  case the analysis  is more 
complicated,  but  the conclusions  are  unaltered. 
9. This is called a strong  natural  monopoly.  The condition  for it is 2F/(1 -  e-rl)  > 
R(Qm)Ir  >  FI(1 -  e-rl).  If this equation  holds, then only one firm  can be economically 
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advantage  by entering  immediately,  since over the life of the machine, 
Bertrand  competition  ensures  that  price  willjust  equal  C, and  the entrant 
will be unable  to recover sunk  costs. There  exists, however, some date 
before T such that it pays the rival  to enter and sink F at that date if the 
incumbent has not already constructed a second set of production 
facilities. For although  the entrant  will earn  zero profits  while both  firms 
are producing  and  until  the original  firm's  plant  wears  out, after  that  date 
the entrant  becomes the monopolist.  But of course, if it pays a rival to 
enter at this date, it certainly  pays the incumbent  to sink Fjust before 
the date. By preempting  its rival, the incumbent  firm  deters the entrant 
from  entering  and  can keep price  at the monopoly  level. To deter  entry, 
then, the incumbent  constructs  new production  facilities every T  years, 
where 0 <  7  < T;  and since the monopolist  is protected  against  entry, it 
produces  at the monopoly  rate, Qm. 
To compute  the entry-deterring  7, suppose  the rival  enters  by sinking 
F at T (<  1) and announces  that it will sink F every T years. If this is 
carried  out, the incumbent  will depart  at T. During  the interval  [T,  T] the 
duopolists  will earn  no operating  profits,  and  from T  onward  the entrant 
will earn  R(Qm)  at each moment. From the vantage  point of t = 0, the 
present  value of profits  accruing  to the entrant  is thus 
(4)  [R(Qt?)e 
-  T]lr  -  [Fe  T/(1  -  e 
1 T)] . 10 
The expression  is zero at a unique value of T:  call this T*. Thus T*  is the 
replacement  interval  for which an entrant  that subsequently  becomes 
the single  producer  just breaks  even. T*  is the solution  to 
(5)  [R(Qm)e -rT/r]  =  [Fe -  rT/(1  -  e'T)]. 
The stationary  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  of the model consists in 
the incumbent's building  production  facilities every T* years. If the 
incumbent  ever delays, it will have lost the market  to the rival,  for if the 
incumbent  does not construct  the second set of production  facilities by 
7*,  the rival gains an advantage  by entering. Once the rival enters by 
sinking  F, the incumbent  cannot find  it profitable  to construct  facilities 
10. The first  term  is  just the present  discounted  value  of the constant  flow  of operating 
profits  R(Qrt9),  beginning  at  date  Twhen  the  incumbent  firm  leaves the  industry.  The  second 
term is just the sum of the infinite geometric series,  F[e --  +  e-2r  +  e-3rT  +  .  .  .  e-t'rr] 
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yet again and then becomes just like any other potential  entrant. The 
incumbent,  knowing  this, is forced to construct  new facilities every  * 
years. And  given  that  it does so, no rival  enters. Since v* < T,  deterrence 
is achieved at a cost: the incumbent  has to maintain  idle facilities over 
the intervals  of time between  the construction  of the new facility,  7, and 
the death  of the old, T. 
In the absence of competition  the present value of the incumbent's 
profits  is 
(6)  [R(Qn)/r] -  [F/(1  -  e-rT)]. 
We have seen that the threat of competition  reduces the incumbent's 
profits  to 
(7)  [R(Qm)/r]  -  [F/(1 -  e- '  *)]. 
Consumers  are entirely  unaffected  by the presence of potential  compe- 
tition, which achieves only a reduction in the incumbent's profits. 
Potential  competition  thus leads to a Pareto  inferior  outcome. 
Though profits are reduced, they are not driven to zero. Because 
T* <  T, a comparison  of equations  5 and 7 shows that the incumbent's 
strategy  to deter  entry  yields positive profits  except in one limiting  case. 
If the rate of interest is small, equation 5 reduces to R(Qrl)T*  F,  and 
profits  in the interval  during  which the machine  produces (before it is 
replaced  by a new machine)  must  just equal the fixed costs. It follows 
then that the incumbent  firm,  which is forced to replace its machine  at 
time intervals  of T*, must also be making  almost no profits. But even 
here the outcome does not resemble at all that of contestable markets. 
Profits  per investment  cycle are wiped out not by expanding  output  to 
Qc but  by constructing  production  facilities  far too frequently.  Thus 
proposition 4: The threat  of entry  forces the incumbent  firm  to construct 
production  facilities  more  frequently  than  is necessary. Entry  is deterred 
not by expanding  output  but by maintaining  idle capacity  during  certain 
intervals  of time. Potential  competition  is deleterious  to social welfare. 
Profits  of the incumbent  remain  positive, except in the limiting  case of a 
zero interest  rate. 
This model has obvious policy implications.  Competition,  actual or 
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Government  regulation,  including  such  restrictions  on entry  as franchis- 
ing, is required.  " 
Now, what happens  as sunk costs become less sunk, that is, as the 
durability  of the equipment goes  to  zero? To obtain a meaningful 
comparison,  assume that the present discounted  value of expenditures 
on fixed  (sunk)  costs remains  the same (if the machine  is replaced  when 
it wears out). Letting F(T) denote the fixed costs associated with a 
technology  in which machines  last T  years, assume that 
F/(1 -  e-  r)  =  k for all T. 
Substituting  in equation  5, one obtains  v(T), the length  of time between 
the construction  of the last machine and the construction  of the next 
machine,  as a function  of the technology, T. Then  (D) is the solution  to 
[R(Qnl) er-u/(1  -  eD- ) = (kre-rT)/(1  -  e-  T). 
Clearly,  as T  goes to zero, T  goes to zero. For small  t, 
T/T  kr/R(Qm); 
the ratio does not go to zero. The price remains  at the monopoly  price 
and profits  do go to zero since the effective interest  rate over a cycle is 
close to zero; but all of the potential  monopoly  profits  are dissipated  as 
excess expenditues  on capacity duplication.  Even though  the expendi- 
tures  on the plant  are sunk  for only one month,  that  is all that  is required 
for the incumbent  to maintain  its monopoly  position. Potential  compe- 
tition simply  forces it to incur  the sunk costs associated with a second 
plant (costs that a potential  entrant  would have to spend as well), say 
two weeks after  the first  plant  has been constructed.  Making  costs less 
sunk  in this way has simply  increased  the inefficiencies  associated  with 
potential  competition.  The  welfare  of consumers  has not  been increased. 
EXIT  AND  ENDOGENOUS  COMPETITION 
The intensity of ex post competition is critical for determining  the 
effectiveness of ex ante competition:  the more intensive ex post com- 
petition,  the less effective ex ante competition. 
11. One  needs to raise  the same caveats noted  in the discussion  of the policy implica- 
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When a firm  enters a market, the entrant  and the incumbent  might 
collude rather  than compete. Alternatively,  the incumbent  might exit. 
In either  case, entry  will not have resulted  in low prices for consumers. 
If collusion, tacit or explicit, is anticipated  and in fact occurs, entry  will 
be encouraged.  The limited  competition  provided  by entry will simply 
dissipate  resources  in excess entry. Consumers  may be little better  off. 
Sunk  costs are again  crucial  to determining  the nature  of the equilib- 
rium.  Remember  that sunk costs can be thought  of as costs that are not 
recovered  upon exit. Indeed, there may even be additional  costs, such 
as those associated  with waste disposal, incurred  upon  exit. 
The choice of technology by the incumbent  and the entrant  affects 
whether  there will be exit, collusion, or competition. And sometimes 
forces conflict.  With  large  exit costs (high  sunk  costs) collusion  is more 
likely, and  this attracts  entry. If the incumbent  firm  reduces sunk  costs, 
its incentives to exit when a rival enters are increased, and this too 
makes  entry attractive.  The incumbent  may not be able to deter entry, 
but entry may also not be effective in ensuring  competition.  That there 
are  profits  after  exit does not lead to regret  on the part  of the exiting  firm 
any more  than  the fact that  profits  before  entry  necessarily  lead  to entry: 
the relevant  question  is not what  is the current  level of profits,  but what 
would profits  have been? Profits  after exit may be positive but would 
have been zero had the incumbent  not exited, and it is this that drives 
exit. 
Forcing exit of the incumbent.  Assume,  as before,  that the entrant 
and  the incumbent  have the same marginal  costs of production  and that 
after entry there is a Bertrand  equilibrium.  Let Fe be the amount the 
entrant  receives upon exit (the amount  of its original  expenditures  that 
it recovers)."2  If a firm  enters the market,  the incumbent  will be better 
off leaving  if Fe > 0. So long  as the incumbent  firm  can  receive something 
when it exits, there is a perfect equilibrium  in which the entrant  enters 
and  the incumbent  leaves. 
There  is, of course, another  perfect  equilibrium  in which the entrant 
stances  under  which the model is applicable,  that is, in which entry restrictions-with 
price  regulations-are  desirable.  Some industries  may attempt  to obtain  protection  from 
competition  even when such restrictions  do not enhance  welfare  as long as they believe 
the price  regulations  are  not so effective  as to reduce  profits  to zero. 
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leaves,  and a mixed-strategy  equilibrium  in which there is a given 
probability  that  each leaves. As I have modeled  the problem,  one cannot 
choose among  the alternative  perfect  equilibria.  Assume, however, that 
the greater the expenditure  on sunk costs, the lower the production 
costs. Then whatever the technology chosen by the incumbent, the 
entrant  will choose a technology with slightly lower production  costs 
(higher  sunk costs). Thus, in the Bertrand  equilibrium,  the entrant  will 
have a slightly positive return  on variable  costs. If one assumes that 
there  are at least some slight  costs associated  with continuing  a produc- 
tion  line  (whether  it produces  or  not), and  denotes  the  present  discounted 
value of those costs by Clr, then the only perfect equilibrium  will entail 
the original  incumbent's  leaving, so long as Cl/r + Fe > O  II 
The persistence  of  monopoly  and  the  advantageous  position  of 
incumbents.  That the original firm will leave the market should be 
contrasted  with  the results  of Partha  Dasgupta  and  Joseph  Stiglitz  on the 
persistence of monopoly, showing that an existing monopolist could 
continue  to maintain  its monopoly  position.  14 Here, I have delineated  a 
rather  different set of circumstances in which the entering firm can 
choose its technology  and an incumbent  cannot maintain  its monopoly 
position.  Latecomers  always  have an  advantage.  This  result  seems more 
in accord  with Schumpeter's  vision of a succession of monopoly firms 
dominating  each market. 
But while competition seems more viable than in the analysis by 
Dasgupta  and Stiglitz, competition  still does not ensure efficiency (or 
zero profits). Prices remain  at a monopoly level, and entry may have 
entailed socially unnecessary  expenditures  on sunk costs.'5 These ex- 
penditures  are simply the means by which the entrant  "steals" profits 
away  from  the incumbent. 
More  potential  competitors  may  entail  less  effective  competi- 
tion. Earlier,  I argued  that the more  effective ex post competition  was, 
the less  effective potential competition would be.  There are some 
13. Appendix  A provides  an  alternative  and  simpler  formulation  of the  exit-entry  game 
in which  the threat  of entry  has no effect on price,  either  because  there  will be no entry  or 
entry  will immediately  be followed  by the exit of the incumbent. 
14. Partha  Dasgupta  and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Uncertainty,  Industrial  Structure,  and 
the Speed  of R&D,"  Bell  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 11  (Spring  1980),  pp. 1-28. 
15. Because the entrant  has chosen a technology  with slightly  lower marginal  costs, 
however,  price  will be slightly  lower after  entry than  before. Unnecessary  expenditures 
on sunk costs will normally  be the case if the incumbent  does not recover all initial 
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circumstances  under  which  the  easier  entry  is, the less effective  potential 
competition  will be. 
There is a simple explanation of this seeming paradox. Potential 
entrants  will enter  only if they believe that they can earn profits.  But if 
they believe that profits  will be quickly stolen by subsequent  entrants, 
they may  be deterred  from  entry.  It is not only the incumbent  that  deters 
entry:  potential  entrants  themselves deter entry. Entry  is motivated  by 
the search  for monopoly  rents. 
The model just presented illustrates this point. Assume there are 
many  potential  competitors  but  that,  for simplicity,  only one competitor 
can enter each period. Any potential  entrant  knows there can be a still 
later  entrant  that  will steal the market  away from  it. If the fixed costs of 
entering (net of the costs recovered upon exit) are greater than the 
maximized  value  of operating  profits  for the one period  during  which  the 
entrant  would  dominate  the market,  it will not pay to enter. 
The incumbent,  knowing  this, may be able to design an appropriate 
strategy  to deter entry. Let N(C) be the value of nonrecoverable  sunk 
costs associated with a technology that has variable costs C.16 Let 
R(Q,C)  be operating  profits  when marginal  costs are C and output  is Q, 
and let Qm(C)  be the monopoly  output  corresponding  to marginal  costs 
C. The incumbent  can deter entry by choosing a technology with low 
enough  variable  costs. The entry-deterring  technology  is the solution  to 
(8)  R[Qnl(Cd),  Cd]  =  N  (Cd).  17 
Potential  entry  has now simply  distorted  the production  decision of the 
incumbent  firm. The incumbent chooses a technology with a lower 
variable  cost, and this leads to a lower price-but  the price is not the 
competitive price, profits are not zero, and indeed, the technology 
chosen  will in general  be inefficient.  18 
Limiting case of small sunk costs.  I now consider the limiting case in 
16. That  is, if the firm  incurs  a cost of E upon entering  and recovers  F, upon exit a 
period  later,  then  N  =  E  -  [FI/(l + r)], where  r is the rate  of interest. 
17. The entry-deterring  technology  given in this equation  assumes that the entrant 
remains  only  one period.  If the entrant  remains  permanently,  the corresponding  equation 
is R[Qz(Cb), Cb]lr  =  E (Cb), where  E (C) is the entry  cost for a technology  with variable 
costs C. If there  are  some  costs recoverable  upon  exit, then  N(C) < E(C) > rE(C), provided 
the interest  rate is less than unity. Thus in the general  case, entry deterrence  requires 
choosing  C = min  [Cd,  Cb]. 
18. The  efficient  technology  is the one that  minimizes  the present  discounted  value  of 
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which sunk  costs go to zero. At the same time, I consider  what happens 
as the number  of potential  entrants  increases. To do this, I modify the 
model slightly, moving to the straightforward  continuous-time  adapta- 
tion of the discrete time model. Let +  represent  the probability  of the 
arrival  of a potential  entrant  per unit of time. For what value of C is it 
that the expected returns to entering are just zero? Assume for the 
moment that there is no entry deterrence. The expected net present 
discounted  value of profits is {R[Q(C), C]/r}  -  e. The incumbent firm 
lowers this-and  lowers its own profits-by  lowering  C. If it lowers C 
enough, the profits  will be zero and entry will be deterred.  Denote the 
technology  for which this is true by Cd. Hence the first  firm's  expected 
profits  (gross of entry costs) from  pursuing  the entry-deterring  strategy 
are just e. 
Alternatively,  the incumbent  can  allow  entry.  The present  discounted 
value of its profits  gross of entry  costs is then 
{R[Q(C'n),  C'Pu]  +  4~Fe}/(r  + 4).  19 
The incumbent  is indifferent  concerning  whether  to deter  or not to deter 
entry  if 
{  =  {R[Q(C1?7),  Cn"]  +  4)Fe}/(r  +  4). 
Now let the fraction  of total costs that  are not sunk  be F (= Fe/E).  Entry 
deterrence  then occurs if 
(D  1 -  (r/4)  * [RIEr  -  1]. 
having  variable  costs C, then  C is chosen  to min  E(C)  +  (CQ/r), which  will, in the relevant 
cases, entail  higher  variable  costs than  those chosen  by the entry-deterring  incumbent. 
It may not, of course, pay the incumbent  to deter entry-that  is, it is possible that 
maxR(Q, C) -  N(C) > R[Q(Cd),  Cd]l[r  -  E(C'9], where Cd iS the entry-deterring technology, 
the solution  to equation  8. 
Later, in a slightly  different  context, I show that  entry  depends  on whether  there  are 
an  odd  or  an  even number  of firms.  With  an  infinite  number  of potential  entrants,  I describe 
a mixed-strategy  equilibrium.  There  is an equilibrium  of this  form  here  too: in each period 
there  is a given probability  that  some firm  will enter  and  displace  the existing  firm.  Prices, 
meanwhile,  only gradually  get shaved  down. Indeed,  under  the usual  assumptions  that  an 
entrant  can steal the entire  market  if it charges  an amount  just below the prevailing  price, 
the price  may  remain  near  the monopoly  price  indefinitely. 
19. If no potential  entrant  arrives  until  time T, the present  discounted  value  of profits 
is [R(1 -  e-r/)lr]  + e-rTF,).  The probability  that  the first  potential  entrant  arrives  at time 
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Two results emerge. First, with small sunk costs (ID  near unity), so 
long as there is limited potential entry (? is finite), price is set at the 
monopoly  price;  there  is no limit  pricing.  One monopolist  is succeeded 
by another,  with  infinitesimal  decreases  in prices. Second, as the number 
of potential  entrants  increases  to infinity,  the incumbent  always engages 
in entry deterrence. Although this reaction results in what might be 
viewed as limit  pricing,  the price is not set at the competitive  price and 
profits  are not equal to zero. Only as entry costs (e) go to zero will the 
competitive  outcome  be attained. 
COLLUSIVE  BEHAVIOR  WITH  EXIT  COSTS 
The  previous  sections  showed  how an  entrant  can  drive  the incumbent 
out of the market. Entry leads not to  competition but to  exit; or 
alternatively,  the threat  of entry leads to the choice of entry-deterring 
technologies  by the incumbent. 
Rather  than fighting  or exiting, the incumbent  can collude. And the 
entrant-again by choice of technology-can  facilitate that collusion. 
Assume the incumbent  has chosen a technology with high exit costs to 
persuade  the potential  entrant  that  it, the incumbent,  will  not leave. Now 
the entrant  needs to persuade  the incumbent  that  the incumbent  is better 
off cooperating  than fighting.  The entrant  can do this, as I shall now 
show  by a simple  extension  of the  model.  Assume  there  are  three  periods, 
each  divided  into  two parts.  In  the  first  part  the  firms  must  simultaneously 
make an exit-entry decision. In the second part, each having seen its 
rival's  exit-entry  decision, they simultaneously  make  a pricing  decision. 
The structure  of the argument  is simple. If the entrant  enters, there 
are  three  equilibria  in the third  period:  the incumbent  leaves, the entrant 
leaves, or there is a mixed-strategy  equilibrium.  The entrant  promises 
to leave  in  the  third  period-leaving the  incumbent  to enjoy  the  monopoly 
profit-if the incumbent  shares  the market  in an appropriate  way in the 
second period. In other words, the entrant bribes the incumbent to 
collude  by holding  out the prospect  of exiting in the third  period. If the 
incumbent  does not cooperate,  the entrant  announces  a mixed strategy, 
which  entails  some probability  of not leaving. The promise  of leaving  if 
the incumbent  cooperates is credible since the entrant's profits upon 
leaving  are at least as great  as if it stays in. And the threat  not to leave 
(to play the mixed strategy)  if the incumbent  does not cooperate  is also 904  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Figure 4.  Collusive Equilibrium 
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credible,  since if the entrant  does not leave, the Nash equilibrium  entails 
playing  the mixed strategy.  Given these credible  promises  and threats, 
it pays the incumbent  to cooperate. Figure  4 depicts the equilibrium. 
I now investigate in greater  detail the circumstances  in which this 
collusive outcome can be sustained  as part  of a noncooperative  equilib- 
rium. 
Assume that there is a time discount  factor of 8 =  1/(1 + r) and that 
monopoly profits, 7m, are growing at the rate g. The incumbent  firm 
receives F, upon departure  and the entrant  receives Fe upon departure 
(F, and  Fe can  be positive or negative).  The entrant  announces  that  if the 
incumbent  charges  the monopoly  price  in the second period  and  lets the 
entrant  have a fraction  (1 -  cx)  of the market,  the entrant  will leave in 
the third  period. If the incumbent  does not cooperate, the entrant  will 
play the noncooperative-equilibrium  mixed strategy the third period. 
This entails an entrant's  leaving a fraction, e, of the time. When the 
entrant does not leave and its rival also does not leave, the entrant 
charges  a price equal to the marginal  cost of production.  When  its rival 
does leave, the entrant charges the monopoly price. The incumbent 
similarly  leaves a fraction, ,I, of the time, and  when it does not leave, it 
follows the same pricing  policy as the entrant.  Profits  from leaving are 
Fi (i =  I, e); expected profits  from staying are, for the entrant, 13PimT. Joseph E. Stiglitz  905 
Thus P  is chosen to make the entrant  indifferent  between staying and 
leaving: 
(9)  3=  Fe/7mT 
And  13e is chosen to make  the incumbent  indifferent  between staying  and 
leaving: 
(10)  Pe  =  F1/IT,71 
The incumbent  also announces  that if the entrant  cooperates in the 
second  period,  the incumbent  will remain  in the third;  if the entrant  does 
not cooperate,  the incumbent  will pursue  the mixed strategy  described 
above. 
Viability  of cooperation. First, one must check to see whether the 
entrant's promise to leave if the incumbent cooperates is credible. 
Assume that there has been cooperation  in the second period, in which 
case the incumbent  will not exit. The optimal  action of the entrant  is 
then to exit, provided  only that  Fe  ?  0. (If the entrant  does not exit, its 
third-period  profits  are zero; whenever  both firms  are in the market,  the 
Bertrand  equilibrium  prevails.)  Similarly,  if the entrant  always  exits, the 
incumbent  is better  off to stay in, provided  only that  F, '  -a,,. 
Next, I show that the threat  to play the mixed strategy,  if there has 
not been cooperation,  is credible.  The mixed strategy  described  above 
is a Nash equilibrium,  and  given that  each firm  believes the other  is going 
to play the mixed strategy (if there is no cooperation in the second 
period),  the rival  will be better  off playing  the mixed strategy. 
Consider  now the second period. Assume the entrant  has entered. If 
the incumbent  firm  cooperates, its profits  must be greater  than  or equal 
to the profits  if it does not, that  is, 
(1  1)  ct7rm  +  8gin T,  ?n7  +  6F1. 
If the incumbent  decides to cheat, it simply  undercuts  the entrant  in the 
second period, stealing  the entire monopoly  profit;  the incumbent  then 
exits, obtaining  F, the third  period. 
Similarly,  it must  not pay the entrant  to cheat, that  is, 
(12)  (1  -  )0tn  +  8Fe  ?I  TNm  +  Fe. 
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for the incumbent  to cooperate,  we require  (rewriting  equation 11)  F, ? 
(bg  - 
Note that  once again,  entry  does not make consumers  better  off: the 
price is still the monopoly  price. All that happens  is that the monopoly 
profits  are shared,  and  real social costs are incurred. 
In appendix  B to this paper,  I show that  if the number  of periods  gets 
extended, the range of cooperative equilibrium  (sharing  rules) for the 
second period  is increased.20 
Entry deterrence.  I have  thus provided conditions  under which,  if 
entry  occurs, there  will be a collusive equilibrium.  Entry  will thus occur 
if the above condition  is satisfied  and  if the entry  costs, E, are sufficiently 
small, so that e  '  ITM  +  bFe.  Thus to deter entry, the incumbent  firm 
must choose a technology  for which cooperation  does not pay, one for 
which  F, is high.2" 
If 8 =  1 and  g =  1, then for there  not to be a cooperative  equilibrium 
the incumbent  need only set F1 >  0. But doing this ensures entry with 
some probability.22  Thus in this case  there are but three possible 
20. There is,  in fact, a general theorem that as the number  of periods becomes 
indefinitely  large,  if the discount  factor  is 1, then  essentially  all cooperative  equilibria  can 
be attained.  The Folk theorem  can be extended  to finite  period  games  if there  are  multiple 
equilibria,  as here.  See Jean-Pierre  Benoit  and  Vijay  Krishna,  "Finitely  Repeated  Games,' 
Econometrica,  vol. 53 (July  1985),  pp. 905-22. 
Experimental  evidence suggests  the collusive behavior  may be easier  to achieve than 
suggested  by the  game  theoretic  analysis.  The  particular  game  theoretic  formulation  I have 
developed  here, however, has been criticized  in that future  behavior  is affected  by past 
actions that do not affect the current  state other  than  through  the announced  strategies. 
On  the principle  that  bygones  should  be bygones,  it is argued  that  whatever  is a reasonable 
equilibrium  beginning  at date t should  depend  only on state variables  at time t, or beliefs 
about  state variables. 
21. Though  no cooperative  equilibrium  exists, several other perfect  equilibria  may, 
some of which entail entry  and some of which do not. For instance,  the incumbent  firm 
announces  its strategy  that, in any period  in which an entrant  arrives,  it will charge  the 
competitive  price, and in the following periods  will play the mixed strategy  described 
earlier.  There  then exists a perfect  equilibrium  with no entry, as long as E 2  8 F,  that  is, 
as long  as there  are  some  nonrecoverable  (in  terms  of discounted  value)  sunk  costs. In this 
equilibrium  the incumbent  charges  the monopoly  price:  the threat  of entry  is ineffective. 
22. There  is a perfect  equilibrium  for which  the entrant  enters, the incumbent  leaves, 
and  prices  are  set at the monopoly  level. There  is another  perfect  equilibrium  in which  the 
entrant  enters with some probability  and the incumbent  leaves with some probability. 
When  they are both in the market,  prices are Bertrand  prices; when only one is in the 
market,  prices  are  set at the monopoly  level. The  probabilities  of entry  and  exit are  chosen 
to ensure  zero expected  profits  for the incumbent  and expected profits  equal  to the entry 
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outcomes: with F, negative, entry occurs and there is collusion; the 
threat of entry does not act as a discipline on current  price. If F, is 
positive, entry  and  exit may  occur, with  price  remaining  at the monopoly 
price; or, alternatively,  occasional price wars may break out. Either 
equilibrium  may occur, regardless  of the size of entry  and sunk costs- 
as sunk costs go to zero, prices do not necessarily converge to the 
competitive  level. Even if there are price wars, the effects on expected 
price  of reducing  sunk  costs are ambiguous.  As sunk  costs go to zero as 
a fraction  of total entry costs, there is still a finite fraction  of the time 
that  prices in the second period  will be at the monopoly  level. And even 
when prices in the second period  are at the competitive  level, there is a 
finite probability  that prices the third period will be at the monopoly 
level.23 
ENDOGENOUS  SUNK  COSTS 
Sunk  costs (entry  and  exit costs) affect the nature  of both ex ante and 
ex post competition.  Since both entrants  and the incumbent  know this, 
they naturally  take it into account when making  investment  decisions. 
Put another  way, sunk costs represent  a commitment.  In this section I 
consider  a simple  example in which the incumbent  firm  has a choice of 
alternative  technologies, some of which entail sunk  costs. 
I wish to make two points. First, much of the literature  on contesta- 
bility seems to depend on the existence of technologies with no sunk 
costs. I show that in fact more is required:  technically  efficient  technol- 
ogies cannot exist without sunk costs.  Second, to  deter entry the 
incumbent  firm  may sink more  costs than  is economically  efficient;  thus 
again,  potential  competition  may  result  in a Pareto  inferior  equilibrium.24 
Consider  a situation  in  which  a firm  has  available  to it  two  technologies, 
one involving  sunk costs and the other not. The natural  assumption  is 
that  by making  investments  nonconvertible  (sunk)  a firm  gains  something 
in variable  costs. In the absence of uncertainty  firms  will thus choose 
23. Indeed,  as sunk  costs are  decreased,  if entry  occurs,  it becomes  increasingly  likely 
that  one of the two firms,  and  possibly  both, will exit in the third  period. 
24. The analysis  abstracts  from  uncertainty.  The presence  of uncertainty  concerning 
future demands  and technologies provides an additional  reason why it may not be 
economically  efficient  (from  a social point  of view) to sink  costs. As a method  of deterring 
entry,  sinking  costs may  have additional  costs besides  those discussed  here. 908  Br  ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
the more efficient sunk-cost  technology (if output  is large enough). So 
long as there is any cost associated  with making  capital  usable at other 
locations or in other industries,  the appropriate  equilibrium  will entail 
sunk costs. The availability  of a technology with no sunk costs,  an 
assumption  probably  belied  by  fact, does have  one important  implication: 
it limits the extent to which a firm can exercise monopoly power. It 
cannot  charge  a price  higher  than  that  at which  a firm  with no sunk  costs 
could enter and make a profit. But this in turn has an important 
implication:  the incumbent  firm  may  choose a technology  that  can deter 
entry even of firms  with no sunk  costs. Thus, assume that the firm  had 
available  to itself two technologies. One entails a higher  sunk cost but 
zero marginal  cost of production  up to some large  scale, Qma,  (see figure 
5). The other  entails  a smaller  sunk  cost but  positive marginal  cost up to 
some output,  Q2.  Assume  that  at  the monopoly  level of output  the second 
technology  is more  efficient  than  the first. (This  is assumed  true even at 
the monopoly output for the technology with zero marginal cost.) 
Consider  now a third  technology  that  entails  no sunk  costs, the contest- 
ability technology. A firm  will enter using this technology, provided  it 
can make a profit  or at least break  even. If the incumbent  chooses the 
first technology, it would, in the Bertrand  equilibrium,  dump on the 
market Q,nla  if an entrant  entered the market, while if it chooses the 
second  technology,  it would  dump  on the market  Q2.  Denote the residual 
demand  curves facing the potential entrant  in two situations  by D'D' 
and  D"D"  respectively,  and  assume  that  D"D"  intersects  the average  cost 
curve,  while  the average  cost curve  is everywhere  above  D'D' (see figure 
5). Thus by choosing the inefficient  technology (with large sunk costs), 
the firm  is able to deter  entry  even of firms  with no sunk  costs. Whether 
this is more profitable  depends on a comparison  of monopoly profits 
with inefficient  technology  and  profits  with the equilibrium  prices in the 
contestable  equilibrium  with  the second  technology.  Either  is possible.25 
When firms  resort to inefficient  entry deterrence  devices, they will 
25.  The equilibrium  price is the solution  to D  (Q2  +  Q)  =  A(Q,),  where  A(Q) is the 
average  cost curve  of the contestable  technology  and  Q. is the  output  of the firm  employing 
that  technology.  Thus  the profits  of the incumbent  over two periods  (ignoring  discounting) 
with technology  2 are R[Q(C2),  C2] +  [A(Qc)  -  C2]Q2  -  E2,  and profits  with the entry- 
deterring  technology  are  2R[Q(CI), CI] -  E1,  where  Ci is marginal  costs with  technology  i, 
Ei is sunk  costs, R(Q, Cj)  is operating  profits  from  a monopolist  operating  technology  i with 
variable  costs Ci  at output  Q, and Q(C)  is the profit-maximizing  level of output. 
This, I take it, is a correct version of the argument  for excess capacity  as an entry Joseph  E. Stiglitz  909 
Figure 5.  Use of Inefficient Technologies to Deter Entry 
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naturally  ask themselves whether  other strategic  policies would enable 
them to deter entry as effectively, and which ones would cost the least 
to implement.  One could imagine  a large  variety  of contracts  that a firm 
could sign with third  parties, contracts  saying  that the firm  will pay the 
third  party  a large  fixed  amount  on the condition  that  the third  party  does 
not  retaliate  in  the event  of entry.  Such  contracts  make  fierce  competition 
deterrent  put  forward  by Michael  Spence, who did  not distinguish  between  sunk  and  fixed 
costs and  did  not  formulate  a strategic  equilibrium  model.  Avinash  Dixit  correctly  criticized 
him  on the grounds  that, with a Cournot  quantity  setting  postentry  equilibrium  in which 
capacity  changes only the maximum  output, not the marginal  cost of production,  the 
excess capacity  would  not be used after  entry  and thus would  not constitute  an effective 
entry.  See Avinash  Dixit, "A Model  of Duopoly  Suggesting  a Theory  of Entry  Barriers," 
Bell Journal of Economics,  vol. 10 (Spring  1979),  pp. 20-32. But the Cournot  quantity 
setting  postentry  equilibrium  is not the only possible  equilibrium.  Indeed,  in the presence 
of excess capacity, there is likely to be price competition.  Hence I have modeled the 
postentry  equilibrium  as entailing  price competition.  However, if there are small sunk 
costs with inelastic demand,  entry deterrence  can occur with arbitrarily  small excess 
capacity.  The potential  entrant  firm  knows that  if it enters, price  will be bid down to the 
marginal  cost of production,  and  the firm  will be unable  to recuperate  its sunk  costs. This 
case, in which  there  is some technology  with no sunk costs, is one in which significant 
excess capacity  may  be created  to deter  entry. 
More  generally,  even with Cournot  equilibrium,  if an increase  in capacity  decreases 
short-run  marginal  costs at all outputs,  then there  is a gain  from  excess capacity  (that  is, 
from  choosing  a capital  stock larger  than  which  minimizes  the firm's  cost of producing  its 
equilibrium  output).  See Marius  Schwartz  and Michael Baumann,  "Entry-Deterrence 
Externalities  and Relative  Firm  Size," International Jouirnal of Industrial Organization 
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in a postentry  game credible  and thus serve to deter entry. And since, 
under  the nonstochastic  assumptions  of my analysis,  entry  never  occurs, 
these contracts  have no costs associated with them. However, there is 
an incentive for the third party and the incumbent  to renegotiate  the 
contract  in the second period  should  entry  occur, for the third  party  will 
realize that unless it renegotiates, it will receive nothing, while if it 
renegotiates,  it can at least get something,  and the original  incumbent 
can gain  from  renegotiation  as well. Knowing  this, the entrant  may not 
really  believe such contracts  are credible. 
There are two alternative  ways of interpreting  why one does not see 
such  contracts.  Sunk  costs may be sufficiently  important  that  they serve 
as a costless entry barrier,  and hence these contracts  are unnecessary. 
There  may also be important  stochastic  elements. 
The general  point  remains:  the incumbent  firm's  choice of technology 
will be affected by the threat  of entry. It may choose a technology that 
will deter entry. It may choose a technology that will make another 
firm's entry unprofitable  if the two firms compete vigorously. The 
incumbent firm may choose a technology that will make the entrant 
believe that  it will not exit. Or  it may choose a technology  that  will make 
the entrant  believe it will not cooperate. The incumbent  will choose to 
sink costs: the contestability  doctrine  requires  that no technology with 
sunk costs be available, a clearly inadmissible  assumption. And the 
technology chosen in response to the threat  of competition  will not, in 
general,  be the efficient  technology. 
RENT  DISSIPATION 
A general lesson that emerges from the preceding sections is that 
potential  competition  does not suffice  to ensure  zero profits. 
The first  firm  in an industry  has an advantage  that successors cannot 
completely eliminate.  Not surprisingly,  there may be a race to become 
the first incumbent  firm  in an industry, and this race may or may not 
completely  dissipate  the potential  rents. 
If there are several competitors, all equally well situated, then the 
race to become the first firm  can be viewed as if it were a patent race, 
and in some cases this situation  does result in rent dissipation.26  It may 
26. Drew Fudenberg  and others, "Preemption,  Leapfrogging,  and Competition  in 
Patent Races,"  Eluropean  Economnic  Review, vol. 22 (June 1983), pp. 3-31. Joseph E. Stiglitz  911 
even pay firms to obtain patents on products that are not currently 
commercially  viable. In such circumstances  the early research is also 
not socially desirable and should be postponed until the product is 
commercially  viable. The early research  is a form of rent dissipation.27 
In instances in which there is learning  by doing, it may pay to begin 
producing  while price is below marginal  cost (earning  a negative profit 
flow).  28 
However, firms  are seldom in identical  positions to begin with, and 
the firm  that  is in an advantageous  position  may  forestall  its competitors 
with only limited expenditures  on R&D, as we shall see later. First, 
however,  a few objections  that  have been raised  to my basic  results  need 
to be addressed. 
Objections 
The  previous  section argued  that  even with small  sunk  costs potential 
competition  would not suffice  either  to ensure  economic efficiency  or to 
ensure  that  the gains  from  efficient  production  would be passed along  to 
consumers-that is, that  the profits  would be driven  to zero. Moreover, 
even entry  itself may not ensure  effective competition,  since the incum- 
bent  firm  may accommodate  itself to the entry  and  collusion  may result. 
Advocates  of the  view that  potential  competition  will  ensure  economic 
efficiency  and  zero profits  have raised  objections  to this analysis, which 
fall  into  two categories:  that  I have assumed  that  competition  is too fierce 
or that I have not taken account of all the possibilities of competition 
(that  is, that  I have assumed  competition  is insufficiently  fierce). 
If competition  is less fierce than  Bertrand  competition  with homoge- 
neous products,  then after  entry, firms  may profit  and  these profits  may 
induce  further  entry.  By the same  token, of course, neither  potential  nor 
limited  actual competition  suffices to ensure zero profits  or economic 
efficiency.  There  may be grounds  for government  intervention. 
There are three forms that limited competition may take: lags in 
adjustment, imperfect substitutability, and  Cournot (rather than 
Bertrand)  responses. 
27. Partha  Dasgupta, Richard  J. Gilbert, and Joseph E.  Stiglitz, "Invention and 
Innovation  under  Alternative  Market  Structures:  The  Case  of Natural  Resources,  "  Review 
of Economic Studies, vol. 69 (October  1982),  pp. 567-82. 
28. Partha  Dasgupta  and  Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Learning  by Doing, Market  Structure, 
and  Industrial  and  Trade  Policies," Oxford Economic Papers (forthcoming). 912  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
LAGS 
If the incumbent  firm  cannot immediately  lower its price upon the 
arrival  of an entrant,  then potential  competition-the  threat  of entry- 
may  affect  the firm's  pricing  decision. If the firm  charges  too high  a price, 
an entrant can come in and steal customers before it can respond. 
Because competition  after  entry  is limited,  there  are  incentives  to enter; 
this is what  enables  potential  competition  to exert its disciplinary  role. 
The presence  of these response  lags is in itself evidence of sunk  costs. 
If firms  cannot change their prices for a fixed period of time, then the 
pricing decision is like a sunk, temporarily  irreversible investment 
decision. Is it plausible  that  the adjustment  costs associated  with pricing 
decisions  are  larger  than  the  adjustment  costs associated  with  production 
decisions, that it takes longer  to alter the former  than the latter?  In the 
one celebrated  example  in which sunk  costs are alleged  to be relatively 
unimportant-the airline industry-prices  typically fall very quickly 
after entry and rise quickly after exit.  Obviously, the airlines (and 
potential  entrants)  do not consider  that  preentry  prices  need  prevail  after 
entry. Indeed,  it has been argued  that  when the existing  airlines  failed  to 
respond  by lowering  prices,  they did so solely because  of fear  of antitrust 
prosecution. Thus it is government policy that restricts firms from 
responding.  But  one of the objectives  of this study  is to ask, what should 
government  policies be toward  such price  responses? 
Since I believe that response lags in pricing  decisions, particularly 
concerning entry and exit, are typically much shorter than those in 
production, I  have focused attention on models that reflect those 
judgments  concerning  relative adjustment  speeds. But in this section I 
explore the consequences of long price responses. These limitations  in 
response lags are supposedly  one way of limiting  ex post competition 
(and  thus increasing  ex ante competition),  but they are both an implau- 
sible and  an ineffective  way of limiting  ex post competition. 
To examine the effects of price lags, I modify slightly the model 
presented earlier to allow for the fact that firms may not be able to 
respond  instantaneously  to entry  by lowering  their  price. There  are two 
alternative  versions  of the  rigid-price  hypothesis:  in the  version  explored 
next a firm  must announce  any change in prices L periods in advance 
but can vary its price  as frequently  as it wishes.29  In the second version, 
29. The first  announcement  cannot  be made  until  T = 1. Joseph E. Stiglitz  913 
explored  later, a firm  is allowed to vary its price only every L periods. 
In the first  version there  are two possible patterns  of equilibrium:  entry 
accommodation  and  entry  deterrence.  It is easiest if we reformulate  our 
model  in  continuous  time.  The  incumbent  has  a secure  monopoly  position 
from  time zero to time 1;  entry  occurs, if ever, at or after  time 1  030 
Entry deterrence.  After L periods the market  degenerates  to a con- 
ventional  Bertrand  equilibrium,  with price equal  to marginal  cost. Thus 
the entrant  makes  profits  only  during  the  L periods  when  the incumbent's 
price  is fixed  at  ql. Let  r(q)  be the profits  (ignoring  sunk  costs) associated 
with charging  price  q, when a rival  charges  a higher  price  or when there 
is no rival.  Then  the present  discounted  value of the entrant's  profits  is 
[ia(q) *  (1 -  eL)11r  =  V(q, L, r). 
If the incumbent sets its price so that V(q, L,  r)  E,  entry will be 
deterred.  Hence 
q  =  min  (qM11,  q), 
where  q,,1  is the monopoly  price, that is, 7iT'(q,11)  =  0. For each value of 
q, = min  (q,,, q)L, there  is a critical  value of E, which is e*, such that  for 
E >  e*, q1 =  q,,,.  This is just the set of (E,  L) satisfying  V(q,,1,  L, r) =  E. 
For  large  E the threat  of competition  has absolutely  no effect on price. 
For  E < e* the threat  of competition  lowers  the price  below the monopoly 
price  but  not to the competitive  level (marginal  cost of production).  Only 
as  L approaches  infinity  does the price  approach  that  at  which  the entrant 
firm  breaks  even were it to be the sole producer  forever. (Thus  in region 
II in figure  6 the threat of competition  has absolutely no effect on the 
incumbent;  in region  I it has some effect but a limited  one. Note that  for 
short reaction  lags the incumbent  may be able to act as a monopolist 
even with small  entry  costs.) 
The threat  of competition  is also ineffective in eliminating  profits. If 
-rr(q) -rr2(q) =  IT(q), net profits for firm 1, the incumbent, are 
a(qlr  -  E)  =  E2/(l  -  e-L)  -  El, 
where  Ei  is the ith  firm's  entry  costs. If  E1  =E  =  E, the present  discounted 
value of profits is Ee  -IL!(l  -  e  -'L)  0 only as e ->  0 or as rL-*  ox. 
Entry accommodation.  Rather  than attempt  to deter entry, the in- 
30. For simplicity,  the incumbent  is allowed  to announce  a price  reduction  only after 
the entrant  actually  enters;  obviously,  to the extent that  the incumbent  can anticipate  the 
date  of entry,  the effective  response  lag  is reduced. 914  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Figure 6.  Response Lags and Entry 
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cumbent  can decide to accommodate  it. The firm  announces  a strategy 
of the following  form:  it will charge  price q,n  so long as the entrant  does 
so; if the entrant  charges  a lower price, the incumbent  will revert  to the 
Bertrand  strategy  of undercutting  its rival. A perfect equilibrium  exists 
when the entrant  announces  a similar  strategy.  The present  discounted 
value of the profits  if both cooperate is a-(q,)12r. Since, when both use 
the Bertrand  strategy,  profits  are zero, both firms  always benefit  from 
cooperation. 
Whether  the incumbent  firm  chooses to accommodate  or deter entry 
then depends on the relative  value of profits  in the two situations, that 
is, on whether E2/(1 -  er-L)  is greater or less  than wr  (qm)12r.  The locus 
of (E2,  L) at which  the firm  is simply  indifferent  is the dotted  line in figure 
6. Thus for very low values of entry costs, the price  jumps back to the 
monopoly  price. The firm  accommodates  the potential  competitor,  and 
the two firms  act collusively to divide  the market.3' 
31.  When there are many potential  entrants,  the perfect  equilibrium may entail no 
entry when entry can occur at any time.  Assume  a firm enters at a particular date and 
cannot change its price for L periods thereafter. Another potential entrant would then find Joseph E. Stiglitz  915 
An alternative interpretation of price lags.  In the alternative inter- 
pretation  of reaction  lags, the incumbent  firm  can change  its price only 
every L periods. Considerations  of symmetry  dictate that the entrant 
too can change its price only every L periods. The entrant  must then 
decide  when  to enter.  In making  its decision  it needs to take  into account 
the  fact  that  how the incumbent  will  respond  will  depend  on the entrant's 
choice of price  as well as the date  at  which  the firm  enters.  The incumbent 
has a choice of either  fighting  or cooperating,  that  is, dividing  the market 
with  the entrant. 
Assume the entrant  enters L* periods after the incumbent  has set a 
price. I first  show that  accommodation  then is not possible. Assume the 
incumbent  fights by lowering its price just slightly below that of the 
entrant  firm,  which responds  by lowering  its price  just below that of the 
incumbent  when its turn for adjusting  its price comes. The present 
discounted  value of the incumbent's  profits  is then 
(13)  T(q*) (1 -  e - L*)!r(1 -  e  -rL). 
If the incumbent  firm  cooperates  by charging  a price  just equal  to that  of 
the entrant,  the present  discounted  value of its profits  is 
(14)  u(q*)12r. 
It must set (L*, q*) to induce cooperation rather than competition. 
Moreover, when the entrant has the opportunity  to reset its price, 
cooperation  must be more beneficial than fighting. The present dis- 
counted  value of profits  to the entrant  if it fights  is then 
(15)  7T(q*)[1 -  e-r(L-L*)]!r(1  -  e-rL), 
while if it cooperates, they are given by equation 14. Thus to sustain 
cooperation, 
0.5 (1 + k)  F  -r  ?2kl(1  +  k) 
is required, where k  -  e-tL  and F  e -L*.  But this inequality cannot be 
satisfied  because  k ?  1. Hence long-run  cooperation  is not viable. It thus 
pays the entrant  to enter  just after the incumbent  firm  has set its price, 
and  on each occasion that the entrant  has to reset its price, to reset the 
it beneficial to enter a second later, charge an e lower price, and steal the market. Thus the 
first entrant will have profits too small to cover its fixed cost of entry, and again one sees 
the seemingly paradoxical result that more competition results in less competition. 916  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1987 
price  just below the incumbent's.  Thus even with price lags the market 
is characterized  at any moment  by a dominant  seller. And though  prices 
fall, the lags in adjustment  imply that they fall very slowly. For all 
practical  purposes,  prices remain  near  the monopoly  price indefinitely. 
Plausibility  of price  reaction  lags.  Though  I have  argued that the 
presence of price reaction  lags is not enough to restore the validity of 
the contestability  doctrine, I would argue  further  that significant  price 
reaction  lags are not very plausible. (By contrast, production  lags may 
plausibly be significant.)  Indeed, it is easy for the incumbent  firm to 
announce a policy of meeting the competition, charging  a price just 
below that  of the competitor,  down to a price equal  to the marginal  cost 
of production.  Firms  can and  do build  these policies into sales contracts. 
Such a strategy ensures there will be no entry. And the strategy is 
credible, for given that the rival has announced a price in excess of 
marginal  cost, the incumbent  has a choice of either losing the sale or 
meeting the competition. It clearly pays the incumbent to meet the 
competition.  (Again  there  is the seeming  paradox  of an  apparent  increase 
in competition actually resulting in a reduction in effective competi- 
tion.)32 
The issue, of course, is not whether  there  are or are not lags in pricing 
decisions:  there  undoubtedly  are. The  issue is, what  is the length  of these 
lags relative  to the lags in entry, exit, and other  production  decisions? I 
would argue that the pricing lags are relatively short, and that this 
idealization  provides a better description  of the market  than the other 
idealization,  that  they are of the same  order  of magnitude  as exit, entry, 
and  production  decisions. 
IMPERFECT  SUBSTITUTES 
The analysis so far, like the analyses in much of the contestability 
literature,  has focused on firms  producing  perfect substitutes. In such 
situations  Bertrand  competition  drives prices to marginal  cost, and it is 
32.  The consequences  of meeting-the-competition  (or most favored nation) strategies 
were  earlier noted by Steven  C. Salop,  "Practices  That (Credibly) Facilitate  Oligopoly 
Coordination,"  in Joseph E. Stiglitz and G. Frank Mathewson,  eds.,  New Developments 
in the Analysis of Market Structure (MIT Press, 1986), pp. 265-90. They have been further 
analyzed  by Thomas  E.  Cooper,  "Facilitating  Practices  and Most-Favored  Customer 
Pricing" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University,  1984). Joseph E. Stiglitz  917 
this that serves to deter entry. But many, if not most, markets are 
characterized  by firms producing  products that are imperfect substi- 
tutes.33  Imperfect  substitutes  raise a number  of interesting  issues. 
Imperfect  substitutes  and  entry  deterrence.  One  consequence  of 
imperfect  substitutability  is that ex post competition  will be less fierce 
and  hence entry  will  occur  more  easily. Assume, for instance,  the family 
of demand  functions  derived  from  the indirect  utility  function  of the form 
a(q2!q1)Ilql,  where I is the individual's  income  and a'q2!aq1 =  0.5 at 
q2 = ql. Then  it can be shown  that  in the postentry  game  the equilibrium 
price  will be 
q  =  q2  =  C(  +  1)!(o  -  1), 
where u is the elasticity of substitution  between the two commodities. 
It is clear that price exceeds marginal  cost of production,  provided  C is 
less than infinite. Figure 7 shows the critical value of E,  above which 
entry  will not occur, as a function  of u. 
Multiproduct firms  and Ramsey  prices.  Once  one  shifts  attention 
from markets  for homogeneous  products  to markets  with related  com- 
modities, a whole range  of market  structures  needs to be investigated. 
One  firm  could produce  all products  within  the industry.  A second firm 
could  then  enter  by competing  against  only one product  or a whole range 
of products.  Such  questions  are  among  those that  face managers  respon- 
sible for corporate  strategy, both those considering  entering  a market 
and  those attempting  to protect  themselves against  entry. 
One reason for product differentiation  is the fixed cost associated 
with  producing  any product.  Since nonconvexities  are  at the heart  of the 
analysis  of markets  with  differentiated  products,  contestability  doctrine 
would seem to be particularly  useful for analyzing  how such markets 
function. And advocates of the contestability doctrine have indeed 
considered such industries. They have argued that even  when the 
33.  To the extent that this is true, the appropriate model of the economy,  of course,  is 
one of imperfect or monopolistic competition,  not the perfect, competitive Arrow-Debreu 
model. There are important differences between monopolistically  competitive  economies 
and perfectly  competitive  economies,  not  the  least  of  which  is  that the  fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics  do not, in general, apply to them. For a recent survey of 
these models, see Joseph E. Stiglitz,  "Towards a More General Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition," in M. H. Preston and Richard E. Quandt, eds.,  Prices,  Competition,  and 
Equilibrium (Deddington, England: Philip Allan, 1986), pp. 22-69. 918  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Figure 7.  Entry and Imperfect Substitutability 
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technology is such that only one firm  produces, contestability  ensures 
that  it operates  with zero profits,  that  it raises the revenue  to pay for the 
fixed costs by charging  Ramsey prices, and that accordingly  it behaves 
exactly as a government  enterprise  that was constrained  to break  even 
would behave.34  This argument,  while seeming persuasive, is in fact 
inadequate.  For if entry  of competitors  is permitted,  there  are  important 
constraints  on the prices such  an incumbent  firm  can charge,  constraints 
34.  Frank Ramsey,  in his classic  contribution, analyzed how the government should 
raise revenue by excise  taxes in such a way as to minimize deadweight loss.  In the case of 
separable demand functions  with horizontal supply functions,  tax rates were inversely 
related  to  the  elasticity  of  demand.  Under  the  stipulated  conditions  on  demand  and 
technology, Ramsey prices thus entail prices in excess  of marginal cost, with the percentage 
deviation  being  inversely  related  to  the  elasticity  of  demand.  For  a  more  extensive 
discussion,  see,  for instance,  Joseph  E.  Stiglitz,  "The  Theory  of Pareto-Efficient  and 
Optimal Redistributive  Taxation,"  in  Alan  J.  Auerbach  and  Martin Feldstein,  eds., 
Handbook of Public Economics,  vol.  2 (North-Holland,  1987), chap.  15; or Anthony  B. 
Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics  (McGraw-Hill,  1980). Joseph E. Stiglitz  919 
that a government-run  monopoly charging  Ramsey prices would not 
face. And if entry of competitors is not permitted, in the absence of 
regulation  the discriminatory  pricing policies the monopolist would 
engage  in to extract  as much  consumer  surplus  as possible would result 
in pricing  policies far different  from those the government  would have 
used.35 
Exit.  Earlier  I showed how the possibility of exit affected entry. A 
firm might enter believing it could drive out the incumbent. With 
differentiated  products there are greater  incentives for the incumbent 
firm  to stop producing  one of the products it is producing.  Thus there 
are  greater  incentives  for entry. But entry  does not result  in competitive 
prices (prices equaling  marginal  costs). Worse still, the threat  of entry 
induces  the incumbent  to take entry-deterring  actions  that  reduce social 
welfare. 
Assume  two symmetric  products  with  a given  elasticity  of substitution 
between them.36  Assume further  that the incumbent  is producing  both 
commodities  and that exit is impossible. Then, as my earlier analysis 
established,  if there are E sunk costs, there will be no entry (if there is 
Bertrand  competition).  Assume now that the incumbent  firm  receives 
35.  For a fuller discussion  of  this,  see  Sappington  and  Stiglitz,  "Information  and 
Regulation." These also note the further problems, both theoretical and practical, caused 
by the definition of the boundaries of the industry in the presence of pervasive interdepen- 
dencies. If a broad definition is employed, the view of the market economy as a decentralized 
allocative mechanism is vitiated. If a narrow definition is employed, the set of commodities, 
taxes against which can be used to provide the revenues required to finance the fixed costs, 
is unnecessarily circumscribed. 
It should also have been clear that if firms could use nonlinear prices, even if limited to 
charging a fixed service fee, the optimal set of prices would bear little relation to Ramsey- 
Boiteaux prices.  See Anthony  B. Atkinson  and Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "The Design of Tax 
Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation,"  Jou-rnal of Public Economies,  vol.  6 (July- 
August 1976), pp. 55-75. 
The popularity of the view that with nonconvexities  but free entry, market equilibrium 
would be Pareto efficient is surprising. Even  before the publication of Baumol,  Panzer, 
and Willig's contribution, Contestable  Markets, Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
"Monopolistic  Competition  and  Optimum  Product  Diversity,"  American  Economic 
Review, vol. 67 (June 1977), pp. 297-308, had shown that the zero profit condition ensured 
constrained Pareto optimality (that is, in which the government  could not provide lump- 
sum subsidies to firms) only under extremely  stringent conditions that were unlikely to be 
satisfied. (All firms had to face constant elasticity demand curves for their products, with 
the same elasticity.) 
36.  A variant of this model is presented in Kenneth Judd, "Credible Spatial Preemp- 
tion, " Rand Jour  nal of Economics,  vol.  16 (Summer 1985), pp. 153-66. 920  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
F1 upon  exit from  one of the product  lines. Let ardbe the profits  if it exits 
from  one of the two product  lines, arb  if it does not.37  The incumbent  will 
then benefit  from  exiting  from  one of the two product  lines  if  rd  +  F1 > 
lb.  But if this equation  is satisfied,  entry will occur provided  only that 
E  <  ad.  The incumbent  knows this and will thus have an incentive to 
choose technologies  for which exit costs are large; these technologies 
serve as an entry deterrent.  The firm  may choose such a technology, 
even though  costs of production  are higher.  The incumbent  thus has the 
advantage  of a first  mover  arising  from  its ability  to commit  itself not to 
leave.38 
NASH-QUANTITY  EQUILIBRIA  (COURNOT) 
In the analysis so far I have assumed that the two firms play Bertrand 
strategies  in the postentry  game.  Given  the  absence  of  any  capacity 
constraints  and  given  the  constant-returns-to-scale  technology,  this 
seems reasonable.  I investigate  briefly, however,  the consequences  of 
the two firms playing quantity-setting strategies in the postentry game. 
Cournot competition  is less  fierce than Bertrand competition.  This 
means that postentry profits will be larger than under Bertrand compe- 
tition, which in turn means that sunk costs  will serve as a less effective 
barrier to entry. 
Assume,  for instance,  that the industry demand curve  is constant 
elasticity: 
Q =  kc-'p-v. 
Then  postentry  equilibrium  price  is given by 
p  =  c/l[i -  (1/2[)], 
while postentry profits are given by 
F,  =  k[i  -  (l/2vL) aw-1/2hy. 
For each value of [L,  there is a critical value of e above which entry will 
37. The firm  will not earn any profits  on the product  line in which there is direct 
(Bertrand)  competition,  and  the lower  price  on that  product  line  lowers  profits  on the other 
product  line. 
38. The incumbent  may, however,  face a dilemma.  Earlier,  I showed  that  a low value 
of F, (high  exit costs) might  induce an entrant  firm  to believe that should it enter, the 
incumbent  form would cooperate  (since it would not benefit  from leaving) to split the 
monopoly  profits.  There  may  not exist any value  of F, that  will deter  entry. Joseph  E. Stiglitz  921 
not occur. The critical  value is monotonic  in [L (for  relevant  values of i, 
that  is, for L  >-  0.5), with  E approaching  zero as the elasticity  approaches 
infinity.  For finite elasticities of demand,  there is a finite level of sunk 
costs below which entry occurs. But the postentry price is not the 
competitive  price:  even actual  competition  is not enough  to ensure that 
price  equals  average,  let alone marginal,  cost. 
When  there  are  a large  number  of potential  competitors,  profits  net of 
entry costs are driven to zero; the equilibrium  number  of firms, n*, 
solves E  =  k[l  -  (1IniL)]-  'In[L.  Only as E goes to zero do n go off to 
infinity  and  prices  converge  to marginal  cost. Moreover,  with  free entry, 
though  some gains from  competition  are passed on to consumers  in the 
form  of lower prices, some are also dissipated  as excess entry expendi- 
tures. The total resources wasted as  a  result of  competition are 
(n* -  1)  E. As E goes to zero, this goes to kIiL.39  As a fraction  of first-best 
total  expenditures  on the commodity,  this waste amounts  to 1/IL;  that  is, 
for reasonable values of  demand elasticity, the fraction wasted is 
nonnegligible.  Though  profits  are  zero, the economy is far  from  efficient. 
The same question  can be asked that was posed earlier  in the case of 
Bertrand  competition:  What  happens  if firms  are unable to change the 
level at which they produce  for L periods?  In the earlier  case, I noted 
that if the incumbent responded to the threat of potential entry by 
attempting  to deter  it, potential  competition  would  lower  the price  during 
the preentry  period. If the incumbent  responded  to the threat  of com- 
petition by accommodating  it, potential competition would have no 
effect on preentry prices. Now,  potential competition may increase 
prices  during  the preentry  period  if the incumbent  seeks to accommodate 
entry. For if the firm  anticipates  entry, the optimal output during  the 
postentry  period will be lower than the firm's output when it was the 
single producer; it sets  its preentry output at a level between the 
monopoly  and  duopoly  levels. 
CONTRACTS 
While the preceding discussion considered reasons why ex  post 
competition  may be less  fierce than envisioned earlier, so ex  ante 
competition  may be more fierce than envisioned. I now consider two 
reasons  why it is argued  that  potential  competition  may  be effective even 
39.  That is, nE  = k[  1 -  (1/n,)]>-  '/,u, which converges  to k/l,. 922  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
with  effective ex post competition.  One criticism  of the earlier  results  is 
that I have ignored  an important  dimension  of competition-contract- 
ing-and  the other is that implicitly  I must have assumed only limited 
potential  competition.  A closer examination  of both issues shows that 
potential  competition  may be less, not more, effective than suggested 
by the analysis in the preceding section, "Sunk Costs and Potential 
Competition." 
Those who claim that potential competition will ensure economic 
efficiency argue that, to the extent there are sunk production  costs, 
competition  occurs at the contracting  stage. That is, firms  compete for 
customers  before costs are sunk. But even this activity involves some 
sunk costs.  To establish an infrastructure  for negotiating contracts 
involves  learning  something  about  the market,  building  some reputation, 
and  so forth.  Such sunk  costs may  not be large,  but  they are  not absent.40 
And the argument  of the preceding  section established  that only small 
sunk costs were required for potential competition to have limited 
efficacy. 
In fact, economies in which long-term  contracts can be written  and 
enforced may act even less  competitively than economies without 
contracts,  provided  there  are  some sunk  costs associated  with  contracts. 
The  fact that  costs must  be sunk  can fragment  a market,  converting  what 
would appear  to be a large market  with many suppliers  and consumers 
into  a large  number  of small  markets,  each of which  has a limited  number 
of suppliers.  To put  it another  way, when  there  are  contracts,  the existing 
firm  may have customers  locked up, making  successful entry  difficult.  I 
illustrate  this by means  of a highly  stylized  example  in which  equilibrium 
entails  that  almost  all customers  are  locked  up and  potential  competition 
is very ineffective.41 
Time  is discrete. At each date, N individuals  are born. An individual 
lives for precisely T years. This is also the lifetime of a machine. A 
40. In fact, of course, there may be other reasons that contract  competition  may be 
limited. In some R&D markets,  in particular,  it may be virtually  impossible  to design 
contracts  fully specifying  the nature  of the new commodity  to be delivered  and the date 
and  price  of delivery. 
41. As has been  emphasized  in Marius  Schwartz,  "The Nature  and  Scope of Contest- 
ability  Theory," Oxford  Economic  Papers, vol. 38, supplement  (November 1986),  pp. 
37-57, there are other reasons that contracting  may make it less, not more, likely that 
markets  are effectively  contestable.  Contracts  enable  an incumbent  firm  to commit  itself 
to competing  fiercely  should  an entrant  enter;  they make  it more credible  that entry  will 
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machine  costs F to build  and  possesses the capacity  to produce  up to M 
units of a product at zero marginal  cost. Each individual  purchases 
precisely one unit of the product  at each date during  his lifetime. An 
individual's  reservation  price  for the product  is u (> 0) at each date. The 
example  is simplified  enormously  if M  = N. Then efficiency demands 
that  one machine  be constructed  at each date, with the machine  built  at 
date t serving the generation  born at t until both the machine and the 
cohort  die (at t + 1). Indeed,  if T  is large,  there  would  be a large  number 
of machines  and firms, and one would be inclined to assume that the 
market  acts competitively.  This is not so if obtaining  contracts  involves 
sunk  costs. 
We are concerned here with the outcome of a market  economy in 
which  individuals  cannot  sign contracts  with producers  that  are binding 
on their  heirs.  There  are  many  potential  producers.  We suppose  that  the 
cost of signing  a contract  is E (> 0). This, by hypothesis, is sunk. It is 
now easy to check whether there is a subgame-perfect  equilibrium  in 
which  each firm  charges  the reservation  price, u, and  all individuals  sign 
T-year  contracts.  Given that  all producers-current and  future-charge 
u, a representative  individual  loses nothing  by committing  himself to a 
T-year  contract,  and  he gains  E(T- 1), which  he would  have had  to incur 
had he entered the market  at each date during  his lifetime. Thus it is 
optimal  for  him  to sign  such a contract.  Given  that  all  existing  individuals 
have signed such contracts, the only individuals  in the market  at any 
date are the newborn.  If competition  among  firms  is Bertrand  competi- 
tion, not more than one firm  will enter at any date. Thus at each date a 
single  firm  enters, signs T-year  contracts  with all members  of the latest 
cohort, and charges u for the product. The firm cannot recruit older 
cohorts because they have signed binding  contracts with earlier sup- 
pliers.42  In  spite  of the  large  number  of firms  in  the  market,  the equilibrium 
price  is the monopoly  price. 
INCREASING  THE  NUMBER  OF  POTENTIAL  COMPETITORS 
In most of the models explored in the section on sunk costs and 
potential  competition,  I assumed  only one potential  competitor.  Indeed, 
42. I have  not  discussed  the  penalties  associated  with  breaking  a contract.  Equilibrium 
contracts  will entail  penalty  clauses at least strong  enough  to deter  breaking  the contract 
at any  date. Since the individual  knows that  there  will be no occasion, in equilibrium,  for 
him  to break  the contract,  he will not be reluctant  to sign such  a contract. 924  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
two competitors  are all that is required  with Bertrand  competition  to 
ensure that price falls to marginal  costs of production.  Hence most of 
the results  would  be unaffected  by the presence  of more  competitors. 
I have already  noted that there  are some circumstances,  however, in 
which markets may be less  competitive the greater the number of 
potential  competitors.  The reason is simple: a firm's incentive to risk 
entering  a market  to take away some of the profits  of the incumbent  firm 
will be diminished  if it believes that success in doing so will encourage 
other  firms  to enter  the market  and  take  its profits  away. Indeed,  the firm 
might  argue  that  if stealing  customers  away from  the current  incumbent 
is worthwhile,  a later firm  will also find it worthwhile  to steal its cus- 
tomers  away. I will illustrate  this point  with two examples. 
Lags  in response.  The first example  is a slight modification of the 
model developed earlier with lags in response. With many potential 
entrants, each will worry whether a subsequent entrant  will steal the 
market  from him. Assume, for instance, that there are two potential 
entrants. Each firm would know that if it entered first, it would be 
immediately  followed by its rival, and it would be unable  to recover its 
sunk costs. It would thus postpone entering  until a period sufficiently 
close to the date at which the incumbent  is free to vary its price, so that 
its rival  would  not  find  it worthwhile  to enter.43  If there  are  three  potential 
entrants, however, one entrant  enters immediately,  for it knows that 
once there are only two left, neither will enter until just before the 
incumbent firm is once again free to vary its price. The argument 
generalizes:  if there are an even number  of potential  entrants,  then no 
entry occurs until shortly before the incumbent  firm  is free to vary its 
price. If there  are an odd number,  one firm  enters  immediately.  In either 
case the equilibrium  price  remains  at the monopoly  level.44 
43. That  is, if L is the interval  between  price  changes  for any  firm,  X  is the time  of entry 
of the entrant.  The entrant  will then dominate  the market  over the interval  L -  X. The 
time  of entry  is chosen  to produce  zero profits,  that  is, E =  7T  (qFl)(1  -  e - r(L - x))/r(l  -  erL). 
44. These are not, of course, the only perfect  equilibria.  Consider,  for instance, the 
following.  Each  firm  announces  that  if an  odd  number  of firms  has  entered,  it will  not  enter, 
but  if an even number  (or  zero) has entered,  it will. Then  one firm  enters.  The firm  knows 
that  once it enters,  no one else will enter, since now an odd number  of firms  has entered. 
The strategies  are perfect.  Given the strategies  announced  by all other  firms,  if one firm 
should  enter  when  an odd number  of firms  has entered,  it will immediately  be followed  by 
further  entry  and will thus suffer  a loss. (Conversely,  any firm  would  do well to enter if 
there  is an even number  of firms,  for it knows that as soon as it enters, no further  entry Joseph E. Stiglitz  925 
If there  are an infinite  number  of potential  entrants,  a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium  exists, such that the probability  of some firm  entering  per 
unit time, say fl(N), is a function  of the number  of firms  already  in the 
market  (and  the dates at which they entered,  which then specifies when 
the incumbent  firms  will be free to vary  their  prices  once again).  The unit 
of time,  fQ,  is such  that  upon  entry  a firm's  expected return  is  just enough 
to cover its sunk costs. Consider  the limiting  case where L* is infinite. 
Then  fl is a constant  and solves E =  -rmj(r  +  fl). 
Imperfect information and entry deterrence.  Though the models have 
so far assumed that entrants  know perfectly what will happen if they 
enter, information  is in fact imperfect.  They can only guess at what the 
incumbent's  costs are. But the reaction  of the incumbent  to the first  firm 
that attempts  to compete reveals considerable  information,  which is of 
value  to the other  potential  entrants.  If there  were only a single  potential 
entrant,  entry  would be beneficial.  With  many  potential  entrants,  there 
is no entry. 
Assume that whether  the incumbent  firm  has a high or low marginal 
cost of production  is unknown,45  but that following entry, Bertrand 
competition  will break out. For simplicity, assume that the potential 
competitors  all have identical  cost functions;  there  is an  E sunk  cost and 
a constant  marginal  cost Of Ce, up to some capacity  level, Qe.  Thus if the 
incumbent's  marginal  cost is less than  Ce, the entrant  loses its sunk  costs 
E. When there is only one potential entrant, if the incumbent's mar- 
ginal cost is Ch >  Ce,  price equals Ch,  and the entrant  makes a profit  of 
(Ch  -  Ce)Qe/r  -  E, where r is the interest  rate.46  Thus, provided  there is 
a sufficient  probability  that  the incumbent  has high  marginal  costs, there 
will  be entry.  Note that  in this model, entry  will  reveal  information.  With 
an unlimited  number  of potential competitors, as soon as it becomes 
evident  that the incumbent's  marginal  cost is Ch,  entry will occur until 
price  is driven  down to average  cost. Hence the total return  to the first 
entrant  is just (Ch  -  Ce)Qe  -  E. The existence of later  potential  entrants 
will result.) There is another equilibrium  in which no entry occurs; the equilibrium 
strategies  are  the  same  as described  above,  except  odd  is replaced  by even and  conversely. 
There  also exist mixed-strategy  equilibria,  as the discussion  in the text will show. 
45. Salop,  "Strategic  Entry  Deterrence,"  has argued  that  under  these circumstances, 
it may  pay  the incumbent  to signal  its marginal  costs by the price  it charges. 
46. I have reverted  to a discrete  time model  in which there  is a one-period  lag in the 
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deters  entry, and  potential  competition  is thus less effective in disciplin- 
ing the market.47 
Sunk Costs and Innovation 
If, as I have argued, sunk costs are pervasive, and if, as seems the 
case in many contexts, ex post competition is, if not described by a 
Bertrand  model, at least reasonably  fierce, it is no wonder  that  firms  do 
not like to compete  on prices. Firms  may not understand  the multistage- 
game theoretic models I have formulated here, but they know the 
outcome of price wars is unattractive.  They therefore  seek to focus on 
those forms of competition  for which there are potential  profits:  on the 
development  of new products and processes. It may, indeed, be the 
ineffectiveness  of price competition  that directs managerial  energies to 
R&D, as well as providing  the resources  to finance  it.48 
In this section I extend the results of the sections on sunk costs to 
sectors  of the economy in which innovation  is important.  This section is 
divided  into two parts.  First, I argue  that  those aspects of technology  on 
which I focused earlier-increasing returns  and sunk  costs-character- 
ize technological  change. I then show that a small expenditure  on sunk 
costs may enable an incumbent  firm  to maintain  its monopoly position 
without  profits  being driven to zero and with a negligible  effect on the 
pace of innovation.  Potential  competition  may be almost  totally ineffec- 
tive. 
WHY  MARKETS  WITH  TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  ARE 
GENERALLY  IMPERFECTLY  COMPETITIVE 
The standard  approach  to technological  change  treats  the production 
of change  much  like the production  of any other  good or service. There 
is a production  function describing  the relationship  between inputs of 
conventional  factors  and  output  of, say, some good, Q = F(K, L, A), in 
47. The problem  here  is, of course, the inability  of the first  entrant  firm  to appropriate 
the returns  to the information  produced  as a result  of its action. 
48. Recall  the earlier  discussion  on the limitations  on equity and credit  markets  that 
constrain  the ability  of firms  to finance  R&D  by means  other  than  retained  earnings. Joseph E. Stiglitz  927 
which a variable, A,  represents the stock of knowledge just as K 
represents the stock of physical capital. There is then a production 
function relating increments to the state of knowledge to  inputs- 
university  professors, for example-used  in the production  of knowl- 
edge, 
dAldt =  G(KR, LR, AR, A), 
where AR  represents the state of knowledge about how to produce 
knowledge.49 
There  is a naive but fashionable  approach  that, noting  the similarity 
between  the modeling  of the production  of conventional  goods and that 
of information,  argues  that  the "market"  for knowledge  works  just like 
the market  for conventional  goods. This argument  is wrong in several 
important  respects. First, technological change is characterized by 
nonconvexities  in its production.50  Second, if technology  exhibits, say, 
constant returns to scale at a fixed technology (the function F is a 
constant return  to scale in K and L), it exhibits increasing  returns  to 
scale when  inputs  devoted to R&D  are  included.51 From  the perspective 
of the firm,  this means that the value of information  may increase with 
the scale of production.  A discovery that  reduces the cost of producing 
widgets by $1.00 is worth $1,000 a year if 1,000 widgets are produced 
each year, but $10,000  a year if 10,000  widgets are produced  each year. 
The consequence of these nonconvexities is that markets  with and for 
technological  change  are inherently  imperfectly  competitive. They are, 
in a sense, natural  monopolies.52 
49. The  importance  of the state  of knowledge  concerning  learning,  or  learning  to learn, 
has  recently  been stressed  by Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Learning  to Learn,  Localized  Learning 
and Technological  Process," in Partha  Dasgupta  and Paul Stoneman,  eds., Economic 
Policy and Technological Peiformance  (Cambridge University  Press,  1987), pp.  125-53. 
Obviously,  we now need an equation  describing  increments  in AR. For simplicity,  in the 
remainder  of this paper  AR  is assumed  to be fixed  and  is suppressed  in the representation 
of the  function  G. 
50. R. Radner  and  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "A Nonconcavity  in the Value  of Information," 
in Marcel Boyer  and Richard Khilstrom,  eds.,  Bayesian  Models  in Economic  Theoty 
(Elsevier,  1984),  pp. 33-52. 
51. With  even slight  increasing  returns  there  will be a natural  monopolist.  The section 
on sunk  costs and potential  competition  showed that with even small sunk  costs such a 
natural  monopolist  may  be able  to charge  monopoly  prices. 
52. There are several other respects in which technological  change differs from 
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I argued  earlier  that the nature  of equilibrium  with a natural  monop- 
oly-and  in particular  the discipline  provided  by potential  competition- 
depends  on the existence of sunk  costs. Most  expenditures  on R&D  are, 
by their very nature,  sunk costs. The resources spent on a scientist to 
do research  cannot be recovered. Once his time is spent, it is spent.53 
And I showed that natural  monopolies, with even small sunk costs, 
behaved in a far from competitive manner. I also argued that the 
recognition  of the effect of sunk  costs on the nature  of ex post competi- 
tion resulted in firm's sinking  costs or incurring  more sunk costs than 
they otherwise might. Sunk costs, I argued, were endogenous. This 
provides a further  incentive for R&D expenditures  because such ex- 
penditures  are sunk costs that may serve to deter entry. Later in this 
section, I will show that the incumbent,  by sinking a relatively small 
amount in a research program,  can deter potential rivals from even 
entering  the R&D  competition. 
Without  using modern  vocabulary,  Schumpeter  long ago argued  for 
the importance  of R&D  competition.  He did  not have an explicit  welfare 
production  of information.  Hence  the list of reasons  that  technological  change  differs  from 
conventional  commodities  parallels  the list of reasons  that, more  generally,  markets  for 
information  differ  from markets  for conventional  commodities.  These arguments  have 
been  set forth  in  greater  length  in  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "On  the Microeconomics  of Technical 
Progress,"  in George M. Katz, ed.,  Technology Generation in Latin American Manuifac- 
turing Industries  (St.  Martins Press,  1987), pp.  56-77;  and  Stiglitz,  Information  and 
Economic  Analysis  (Oxford  University  Press,  forthcoming). 
While  conventional  theory  focuses on markets  for homogeneous  commodities,  each 
piece  of new  knowledge  must  be  different  from  previously  produced  knowledge.  Moreover, 
one cannot  show the good that  is being  sold in the market  in the way that  a firm  producing 
chairs  can show what  it has produced.  As a result, information  is difficult  to sell. At the 
same  time,  it is difficult  to appropriate  fully  the  returns  to technical  change.  (Though  patent 
laws attempt  to facilitate  the appropriation,  they do so imperfectly.)  Indeed, knowledge 
has  many  of the  properties  of public  goods-being both  difficult  and  undesirable  to exclude. 
Finally,  while investments  in physical  capital  goods are often financed  by borrowing 
and  using  the physical  capital  good  as collateral,  expenditures  on R&D  are  not  for  the most 
part  collateralizable  investments.  Given  limitations  on firms'  abilities  to raise equity, the 
causes of which  are  discussed  in Bruce  Greenwald,  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  and  Andrew  Weiss, 
"Informational  Imperfections  in the Capital  Market  and Macroeconomic  Fluctuations," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  74 (May  1984, Papers  and Proceedings,  1983),  pp. 
194-205, capital  constraints  (credit  rationing)  are thus likely to be more  important  than 
they are  for conventional  investments. 
53. Technological  change  is also  often  produced  as a by-product  of production  (learning 
by doing). These production  decisions too are, by their nature, like sunk costs. The 
importance  of these sunk  costs for market  equilibrium  has been stressed  by Dasgupta  and 
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criterion  with which to evaluate the effectiveness of the competition, 
but in his writings  one can perhaps  detect three  propositions: 
-R&D  competition  results  in profits  being  driven  to zero. 
-R&D  competition results in a succession of firms; competition 
occurs  over time, not at a moment  in time. 
-Competition  results in an efficient level of expenditure  on R&D, 
with the gains from new innovations more than offsetting the static 
inefficiencies  resulting  from the temporary  monopolies to which R&D 
gives  rise. 
In earlier work, Partha  Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz and Richard 
Gilbert  and David Newbery suggested  that all three propositions  were 
incorrect.54  They showed  that  the  threat  of entry  would  indeed  accelerate 
R&D, perhaps  beyond a socially efficient level, but that the profits  of 
the incumbent  firm  would still be positive and  that  it had  an incentive  to 
pace itself at such a rate as to deter  entry, so that  monopoly  persisted. 
That work ignored, however, the important role of  sunk costs. 
Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz  later  suggested  that  with sunk  costs the incumbent 
firm  could  preempt  its potential  rivals  by an expenditure  of only a limited 
amount  of money.55  Thus R&D competition  might  be relatively  ineffec- 
tive: profits  would be even larger  than suggested  in the earlier  analyses, 
and the pace of R&D would differ  little from that engaged  in by a pure 
monopolist.  Potential  competition  need not exercise an effective disci- 
pline  on the market. 
SMALL,  ENTRY-DETERRING  R&D  EXPENDITURES  CAN  OFFER 
COMPLETE  PROTECTION 
Consider  the race  for a patent  in which  the winner  obtains  all property 
rights  to the use of the invention. There is no uncertainty  in the R&D 
technology.  To capture  the patent,  a firm  has  to complete  a fixed  number, 
N, of experiments  before any other firm  does. I assume that a firm  has 
54. Partha  Dasgupta  and Joseph  E. Stiglitz, "Uncertainty,  Industrial  Structure,  and 
the Speed of R&D";  and Richard  J. Gilbert  and David M. G. Newbery, "Preemptive 
Patenting  and  the Persistence  of Monopoly,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 72 (June 
1982),  pp. 514-26. 
55. The  earlier  models  (with  no sunk  costs) were  not really  models  of a patent  race  but 
of a once-and-for-all  decision  about  the allocation  of resources  to R&D.  See Dasgupta  and 
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always to commit  itself to its R&D decision over two periods and that 
capacity constraints  limit each firm  to M experiments,  where N > M. 
Let [NIMI  denote the largest  integer less than or equal to NIM. Write 
n*  [NIM].  Let k*  N  -  n*M-O. 
Suppose to begin with that there is a single firm  facing no actual or 
potential competition. Let the interest rate be positive. If demand  for 
the product  in question is growing, say at a constant rate, there is an 
optimal date, TP,  at which the incumbent  would wish to complete N 
experiments.  Then because the interest  rate is positive, it pays the firm 
to postpone its research  as much as it can toward TP.  It will conduct 
e*(t) experiments  over periods  (t, t +  1)  and  (t +  1, t + 2), where 
e*(t) =  O fort  =  I, . . .,  T*  2n* -  4 
(16)  k*fort=  T* -  2n*  2 
Mfort  =  T* -  2n*  T* -  2n* +  2,...,  T  -- 2. 
Suppose  now that  there  are instead  two firms  and  that  they alternate: 
firm  1  chooses its R&D  policy at odd dates  and  firm  2 at even dates. Thus 
firm  1  has the first  move. Now if the cost of each experiment  (or  anyhow, 
the first  experiment  in the sequence)  is small  enough, firm  1, faced with 
potential  competition,  will  preempt.56  With  the threat  of entry  the unique 
subgame-perfect  equilibrium  consists of firm 1 committing  itself to k 
experiments  at t =  1, rather than at t =  T* -  2n*  -  2, but otherwise 
leaving  its research  program,  e*(t), unaffected.  Firm  2, of course, does 
not do any research  at all. 
This equilibrium  is sustained  by the following  strategies.  The incum- 
bent firm  commits itself at t =  1 to k experiments  during  the interval 
(1, 3) and announces at the same time that at every odd date it will 
commit  itself to the number  of experiments  its rival  will have committed 
itself to at the previous even date. For suppose firm 2 chooses  m 
experiments  at some even date. Unless firm  1  matches  it at the next date, 
firm  2 will no longer  be behind.  It then will pay firm  2 to pursue  exactly 
the same strategy,  matching  whatever  the incumbent  does. If firm  2 does 
that, it will at worst share  the patent,  which, I assume, is also profitable. 
If it does not, it will obtain no return  on its investment. Thus if firm 1 
fails to match  its rival, it loses a considerable  amount  of profit.  Hence it 
56. This assumes that the patent  is worth  a great  deal more  than  having  to share  the 
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is rational  for the incumbent  to match its rival. Because firm  2 knows 
this, the announced  strategy  is credible,  and  so it will not enter. We sum 
up by way of 
proposition  5: Faced with a potential  R&D competitor,  the incumbent 
firm's  optimal  strategy,  which sustains  a subgame-perfect  equilibrium, 
consists of preempting  the potential  entrant  by committing  itself  to e**(t) 
experiments  at each odd date t, in which 
(17)  e**(t)  =  k, t  =  1, 
O  if SI(t) <  S2(t)  -  k, 
M if S2(t) +  k > S  (t) >  S2(t)  -  k, 
min [M, S*(t) -  SI (t)] if SI (t) >  S2(t)  +  k, 
where Si(t) =  lej(7),  the sum of the experiments done to date, and 
St (t) = Let (Xr),  the sum of the experiments  done through  date t by a 
monopolist.  (The  equation  isjust  the  formal  representation  of  the strategy 
I have described  in words.) 
Notice that if (T* -  2n*)  and  M are large  then equation 17  describes 
what  is in effect an epsilon  preemption:  the incumbent  takes a tiny R&D 
lead, and  this is enough  to keep the rival  out of the race.57 
Concluding  Remarks 
Traditional  economic  theory  has emphasized  the importance  of fixed 
costs and the nonconvexities to which they give rise. The presence of 
these  nonconvexities  limits  the extent  of competition.  There  is, however, 
57. The  literature  on the possible  persistence  of monopoly  has suggested  that  to deter 
entry  an  incumbent  firm  would  have  to pursue  as intensive  a research  program  as the most 
aggressive  of its potential  rivals, and that the incumbent  would  benefit  by doing  so. See, 
for example,  Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz,  "Uncertainty,  Industrial  Structure,  and  the Speed of 
R&D"; and Gilbert  and Newbery, "Preemptive  Patenting  and the Persistence  of Mo- 
nopoly.  " 
By  way  of  contrast,  in  Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz,  pp. 11-12,  the  idea  of an  epsilon  preemption 
was introduced  to suggest  that  if R&D  has to be conducted  over a number  of periods,  the 
fact that  it is a sunk  expenditure  gives the incumbent  firm  (provided  it has the first  move) 
much  more  monopoly  power  than  one might  think.  Proposition  5 confirms  this  conjecture. 
The analysis  of this section should  be contrasted  with that of Fudenberg  and others, 
"Preemption,  Leapfrogging,  and Competition  in Patent  Races." In their  analysis, firms 
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a widespread  belief that even if actual competition  is absent, potential 
competition  may be sufficient  to discipline firms  in an industry  and to 
hold prices down. This argument  demands  that scale economies be due 
to costs that  are not sunk. But it has not been recognized  precisely how 
sensitive the conclusions are to the assumptions.  I have shown that the 
presence of arbitrarily  small  sunk  costs can serve as an absolute  barrier 
to entry and make potential competition completely ineffective as a 
discipline  device. 
I have also suggested why it is that so much of the competition in 
modern industrial  economies is focused on innovative activity rather 
than on the price competition  on which conventional  microeconomic 
analysis  focuses-there  is at least a hope that  efforts  put  in this direction 
will yield profits-and  why potential competition may be particularly 
ineffective in those sectors of the economy where R&D is important- 
expenditures  on R&D  are by their  nature  sunk  costs. 
Much of the analysis in this paper  has employed the assumption  of 
Bertrand  competition. I have done this for two reasons. First, with 
Bertrand  (but not with Cournot)  competition  price will equal marginal 
cost in markets  in which the number  of actual participants  is limited. 
Bertrand  competition  thus provides a natural  benchmark:  one should 
not be surprised  that markets without Bertrand  competition are not 
efficient. Second, the standard  "stories" in the contestability  literature 
have firms  undercutting  each other,  that  is, the authors  seem to presume 
that  competition  takes the Bertrand  form. 
I noted in the beginning  that  this was a paper  partly  about  economics, 
partly  about the models we employ to analyze economies. I have made 
use here of the standard  concept of the perfect-equilibrium  solution to 
perfect equilibrium,  in which the firm  that is behind  either does no research  or a lot of 
research,  while  the firm  that  is ahead  either  maintains  the monopoly  pace or accelerates  it 
slightly.  There  is thus  some  probability,  when  the  firm  that  is ahead  maintains  its monopoly 
pace and  the firm  that  is behind  has an accelerated  research  program,  that  the firm  that  is 
behind  leapfrogs  ahead  of its rival  and becomes the new leader.  This leapfrogging  is not 
possible  in our  model.  Which  model  is more  appropriate  depends  on the  lags  in  observation 
and reaction.  If the incumbent  firm  can see the experiments  its rival  is undertaking  and 
responds  quickly,  then  the analysis  of this section, in which  firms  announce  that  they will 
match  their  rivals'  actions  but  in the interim  maintain  a slightly  modified  monopoly  pace, 
seems plausible.  Christopher  Harris  and  John  Vickers, "Perfect  Equilibrium  in a Model 
of a Race," Review  of Economic  Studies,  vol. 52 (April  1985),  pp. 193-209,  have  extended 
the analysis  of the sequential  model  to consider  more  general  technologies.  The  results  are 
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the almost standard  game-theoretic  formulations  of firm interactions, 
with  results  that,  to some, may  seem  disquieting.  That  standard  literature 
has, I think, three distinct  messages: that what is essential for entry is 
entrants'  beliefs about the nature  of ex post competition;  that ex post 
competition  depends  on certain  state  variables;  and  that  entrants'  beliefs 
about the nature  of ex post competition  are arrived  at by a process of 
introspection,  or  backward  induction-they arrive  at them  by calculating 
what it is rational  for the other firm  to do, given that there is common 
knowledge  of both the structure  of the game and the rationality  of the 
participants.  The  first  two hypotheses  I find  eminently  sensible;  the third 
is far more questionable.58  The world is too complicated to be well 
described  by our simple models. Potential  entrants  in the market  may 
be either  not  rational  or not confident  about  the rationality  of their  rivals. 
If potential  entrants  form  their  expectations  concerning  the incumbent's 
responses  by a process of extrapolation  of past  behavior,  then  entry, the 
incumbent's  activities  to deter  it, and  the incumbent's  response  to it may 
markedly  differ  from  those hypothesized  here. If potential  entrants  think 
there  is even a small  chance that the incumbent  may not respond  in the 
ruthless way hypothesized, they may be willing to take the risk of 
entering,  provided sunk costs are not too small. Moreover, equilibria 
with small sunk costs may not look that much different  from equilibria 
with zero sunk  costs.59  These more realistic  models serve to qualify  the 
results described  here, but they also qualify  those results that rely on 
similarly  strong  rationality  hypotheses  to ensure  the efficiency  of market 
economies. 
More  generally,  I have observed  five principles,  the validity  of which 
extends  beyond  the simple  models investigated  here. 
-An  increase  in ex post competition  reduces the effectiveness of ex 
ante  competition,  and  conversely. Thus  government  policies  that  reduce 
ex post competition, such as price regulation, may actually enhance 
58. Even the logical consistency of the third  hypothesis, which underlies  much of 
modern  game  theory, has recently  been called into question  by the work of P. J. Reny, 
"Common Knowledge and Extensive  Form Games,"  Journal of Economic Perspectives 
(forthcoming);  and  K. Binmore,  "Modeling  Rational  Players,"  unpublished  paper  (London 
School  of Economics,  1985).  For surveys  of this work, see K. Binmore  and  A. Branden- 
burger, "Common Knowledge  and Game Theory,"  Journal  of Economic  Perspectives 
(forthcoming). 
59. Richard  McMasters  has  explored  these questions  in a Ph.D. dissertation  presently 
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social welfare, while policies aimed at increasing  ex post competition 
may decrease  it. 
-Both  the incumbent  and the entrant  have at their  disposal mecha- 
nisms that affect the nature  of ex post competition. In particular,  the 
incumbent  may choose to sink costs. In the R&D  problem  discussed in 
the section on sunk  costs and  innovation,  the incumbent  firm  may deter 
entry by spending  a relatively small amount earlier  than it would if it 
were an unconstrained  monopolist. 
-Potential  competition  may decrease welfare as firms  take actions 
to deter  entry.60  Thus the early  expenditures  on R&D  do not result  in an 
innovation  occurring  earlier  than  it otherwise  would, and  consumers  are 
no better  off. But  these entry-deterring  expenditures  do lower  the  present 
discounted  value of the incumbent  firm's  profits.  Similarly,  in the case 
of natural  monopoly,  entry  deterrence  takes the form  of excess capacity 
but  with no benefits  conferred  on consumers.  Firms  may also sink costs 
when it is not efficient  to do so, again  simply  to deter  entry. 
-Actual  entry may not enhance  welfare. Rather,  the entrant  may be 
accommodated through a cooperative arrangement  maintained  as a 
noncooperative  perfect equilibrium.  The incumbent's  monopoly  profits 
are shared  (at the social cost of excessive expenditures  on entry), but 
consumers  are no better  off. 
-Sunk  transactions  costs may further  fragment  markets,  so that the 
effective degree of competition  may be much less than a naive look at 
the number  of firms  and  customers  might  suggest. 
I have shown how these basic principles  cast light on some of the 
informal arguments used to buttress the contestability doctrine. In 
particular,  the argument  that (when there are sunk production  costs) 
competition occurs in going after contracts becomes less persuasive 
once the inevitable sunk costs associated with writing contracts are 
taken into account. Similarly,  price lags may serve to reduce ex post 
competition  and thus encourage entry and make ex ante competition 
more effective. But with small  lags in response, even small entry costs 
will deter  entry. And with infinite  lags in response, entry  will occur, but 
prices may remain  at the monopoly  level: resources are simply  wasted 
on excessive entry. 
60. It is important  not to read  any policy implications  into this result. In particular,  I 
am  not advocating  a reduction  in potential  competition  (and  indeed,  it is not apparent  how 
one could  go about  the reduction).  The concern  here  is only with  ascertaining  the effect of 
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These models  leave the policy analyst  in a quandary.  They teach that 
reliance  on the market  may  not suffice.  They make  it clear  that  in sectors 
in which  increasing  returns  are  important,  deregulation  may  lead neither 
to lower  consumer  prices nor  to more  efficient  production.61  They teach 
that when practices such as exclusive territories  or vertical restraints 
seem to restrict  competition-for instance, by deterring  entry or facili- 
tating collusion-they  may in fact be doing  just that.62  Certainly,  the 
models  provide  no support  for those who would  loosen the enforcement 
of antitrust  laws on the grounds  that  there  are  important  returns-to-scale 
effects in R&D, and potential competition will ensure that even if a 
monopolist  or dominant  firm  emerges, that firm  will have to engage in 
rapid  R&D  to maintain  its position. 
But the models also suggest that government actions designed to 
increase  competition  may have their  costs. As with any natural  monop- 
oly, there  are economies of scale. There  is an obvious solution:  employ 
a welfare-based  antitrust  policy. But such a solution is an illusion: the 
history of antitrust  law enforcement strongly suggests that the legal 
system does not provide a framework within which the necessary 
distinctions  can and  will be made. 
The advantages of simple rules seem clear. The per se doctrine 
represented  one such rule. There are those today who suggest quite 
different,  more permissive rules. The question is one of trade-offs, in 
particular  between the inefficiencies associated with the inability to 
exercise fully the economies of scale and those associated with the 
exercise of monopoly power to which, we have seen, sunk costs give 
rise.63  If one believes, with Schumpeter, that the spur to innovation 
61. For a discussion  of the applicability  of the contestability  doctrine  to rail  or water 
carrier  mergers,  see William  B. Tye, "The Applicability  of the Theory of Contestable 
Markets to Rail/Water Carrier Mergers,"  Logistics  and Transportation Review,  vol.  21 
(March 1985), pp. 57-76. 
62. These  practices,  however,  may  have efficiency  benefits  as well, in which  case one 
has to offset such benefits  with the costs associated  with decreased  competition.  At the 
same  time,  it should  be emphasized  that  these practices  may have efficiency  costs rather 
than  benefits. 
63. At a number  of points  in this paper,  I have called  attention  to the inefficiencies  to 
which entry-deterring  strategies  give rise. It is not apparent,  however, whether these 
activities  will  be greater  with  a strict  or a loose antitrust  policy. With  a strict  policy  a large 
firm  may  be reluctant  to engage  in such  activities,  lest it be subject  to antitrust  prosecution; 
moreover,  the  larger  number  of firms  in  the  market  may  mean  that  entry-deterring  activities 
are  less effective.  With  a loose antitrust  policy,  potential  as well as actual  competition  may 
be decreased,  and  thus  the need  for entry-deterring  policies  may  be reduced. 936  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
provided by competition is  of central importance and if one gives 
credence  to those studies purporting  to show the importance  of small 
firms  in the innovation  process, then the losses associated with a strict 
antitrust  law may be outweighed  by the gains. But this, I am sure, will 
remain  a question  of debate. 
Appendix A: Alternative Formulation  of Entry-Exit Game, 
Single Commodity 
In  an  alternative  formulation  of the entry-exit  game, within  any  period 
there  are four moves. First  the entrant  firm  decides whether  to enter  or, 
if  it is already  in  the  market,  decides  whether  to leave. Then  the  incumbent 
firm  decides whether  to leave. Next, the entrant  sets a price. Finally  the 
incumbent  sets a price. The ordering  of moves is somewhat artificial. 
The results  are similar  to the simultaneous-move  game  described  in text 
but somewhat  simpler  to see. It is clear that in any period  in which the 
firms  coexist, the equilibrium  price  is the Bertrand  price;  for  if the entrant 
sets any price above the Bertrand  price, it gets no sales because the 
incumbent  will undercut.M4  It is also clear that in the third  period, if the 
entrant  does not exit, the incumbent  will find exit beneficial  if and only 
if F, -  0. (If  F1 = 0, the incumbent  is indifferent  to exiting.)  The entrant, 
knowing this, will exit in the third period if and only if F1 c  0 and 
Fe  0). 
Moving  back  a period, if F1  > 0, if entry  occurs in the second period, 
the incumbent  will leave immediately.  Hence entry will occur, but one 
monopolist is replaced with another. If F1 <  0, no entry will occur. 
Again, the threat  of entry  has no effect on prices. 
Appendix B: Multiperiod  Game with Exit 
When  the number  of periods  is extended, one can obtain  a far richer 
set of cooperative equilibria. By the same token, it becomes more 
difficult  for the incumbent  to deter  entry. 
64. The entrant  is actually  indifferent  with respect to the price it charges, since it 
knows it will either  be undercut  or it will make  zero profits  over variable  costs. But if the 
firm  incurs  a cost, whether  it sells the first  unit  or not (that  is, there  are  costs to continuing 
as a firm,  even if it does not produce),  then  the only equilibrium  is the one described  in the 
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To see this, consider the four-period model. The conditions for 
cooperation  in the third  period are the same as those analyzed earlier, 
and  it is assumed  they are satisfied.  Let a2 be the share  of second-period 
monopoly  profits  alloted to the incumbent  firm. It pays for the firm  to 
cooperate,  so long as 
U2r  +  82g2  rr  ?  -r  +  SF1, 
that  is, so long as 
ct2 ?  1 -  82g2  +  (F,8/-rr). 
Similarly,  for the entrant  to cooperate  requires  that 
(1  -  U2)  r +  g-rr +  822F  >  r +  rFe, 
that  is 
Ot2  -< g8  -  8(1  -  8)  Fe/IT. 
It is easy to verify  that  the two conditions  may  be consistent,  and  provide 
a range  of values of a, consistent  with  perfect  equilibrium.  For instance, 
if g  =  8  =  1, cooperation requires that 1  ?- a,  F1/-rr. Comments 
and Discussion 
Daniel McFadden: The main theme of Joseph Stiglitz's paper is that 
sunk costs are ubiquitous  and may be used by incumbents  to preempt 
entrants.  In particular,  investments in R&D can behave as sunk costs 
that permit  an incumbent  to charge monopoly prices without  fear that 
other  firms  will enter. The paper  reviews some of the main  contentions 
on sunk  costs and contestability.  First, if there are positive sunk costs 
and  instantaneous  Bertrand  rivalry  is credible,  then  contestability  fails.  ' 
Second, when sunk excess capacity is needed to make the threat of 
Bertrand  rivalry  credible,  equilibrium  may require  the accommodation 
of small entrants  and the practice of limit pricing.2  Third, eliminating 
real sunk costs by preemptive contracting  is not feasible if contract 
negotiation  itself involves sunk costs. I would add that contracts that 
make an incumbent's  response slow and encourage  entry will be unat- 
tractive  to them. They will seek instead  contracts  that  precommit  them 
to Bertrand  rivalry  in case of entry. 
In the most innovative  part  of his paper, Stiglitz  considers  R&D  as a 
1. See Partha  Dasgupta  and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Uncertainty,  Industrial  Structure, 
and the Speed of R&D," Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11 (Spring  1980), pp. 1-28; 
Richard  J. Gilbert  and  David  M. G. Newbery, "Preemptive  Patenting  and  the Persistence 
of Monopoly,"  American  Economic  Reviewv,  vol. 72 (June 1982),  pp. 514-26;  and  Joseph 
Farrell and Garth Saloner, "Installed Base and Compatibility:  Innovation, Product 
Preannouncements,  and Predation,"  American  Economic Reviewv, vol. 76 (December 
1986),  pp. 940-55. 
2. See Steven  C. Sallop,  "Strategic  Entry  Deterrence,"  American  Economic  Reviewt, 
vol. 69 (May 1979, Papers and Proceedings,  1978), pp. 335-38; Avinash Dixit,  "The Role 
of Investment  in Entry  Deterrence,"  Economic  Jouirnal, vol. 90 (March  1980),  pp. 95-106; 
and Richard  J. Gilbert,  "Preemptive  Competition,"  in Joseph E. Stiglitz  and G. Frank 
Matthews,  eds.,  on Newv  Developments  in tde Analysis  of Market Strlcture  (MIT Press, 
1986),  pp. 90-123. 
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sunk  cost. He argues  that sinking  even a small  amount  to obtain  a slight 
technological  advantage  generates a credible threat that deters entry. 
This is then a model of entry to a patent race.3 The key features of 
Stiglitz's model are that incumbent  and entrants move sequentially, 
incumbent  first.  There  is no exogenous uncertainty,  and  each player  has 
complete  information  on all previous  moves. The actions of the players 
are R&D investment  levels, with a known cumulative  investment  cap- 
turing  a patent  that  conveys property  rights  to production  of the product. 
The  model  also  assumes  that  R&D  costs cannot  be recovered  by divesting 
labs or extracting  rents based on patent agreements  signed by a firm's 
scientists;  hence these costs are sunk. Finally, the model assumes that 
R&D  investment  capacity  is limited,  so two or more  periods  are  required 
to obtain  a patent. 
Stiglitz concludes in this model that the incumbent  has a superior 
strategy that blocks entry: an initial R&D investment, followed by 
matching  any R&D  investment  of the entrant  so as to guarantee  winning 
the patent race. Because of this, a subgame-perfect  equilibrium  exists 
with preemption  through  a small sunk R&D investment  by the incum- 
bent.  Because  entry  does not  occur, the  final  R&D  necessary  to complete 
the patent  is never done. 
A natural  question to ask is whether Stiglitz's conclusions hinge on 
the special assumptions  of this model. First, consider  the possibility  of 
simultaneous  moves (or, equivalently, sequential  moves in which the 
second player  does not know the move of the first  player). In this case 
the players  will follow randomized  strategies,  but preemption  by R&D 
investment  still holds.4 
Second, consider the technology for R&D. A patent resulting  from 
R&D investment  may reduce the marginal  cost of a product, increase 
product quality or introduce differentiation,  thus increasing product 
demand,  or  convey  property  rights  to production  of the  product.  Stiglitz'  s 
model  considers  the last case, in which  there  is no direct  social return  to 
3. Related models have been developed by Dasgupta  and Stiglitz, "Uncertainty, 
Industrial  Structure,  and  the  Speed  of  R&D";  Gilbert  and  Newbery,  "Preemptive  Patenting 
and the Persistence  of Monopoly"; and Drew Fudenberg  and others, "Preemption, 
Leapfrogging,  and Competition  in Patent  Races," European Economic  Reviewi, vol. 22 
(June  1983),  pp. 3-31. 
4. Fudenberg  and others, "Preemption,  Leapfrogging,  and Competition  in Patent 
Races.  " 940  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
R&D.  There  is thus  a social  cost to the  early  preemptive  R&D  investment 
as well as to the monopoly  pricing  the incumbent  can practice  when the 
preemptive  investment  deters entry. If the marginal  cost of a product  is 
reduced  or product  quality  is improved,  there  may be both an appropri- 
able and a net direct social return  to R&D, and both the behavior  of the 
incumbent  and  the social consequences  require  further  examination. 
If R&D  activities  involve setup  costs, then  long-term  expenditures  at 
a steady rate will be more productive  than  the same cumulative  invest- 
ment  cycled on and  off. Such  cycling  makes  preemption  more  expensive 
to the incumbent. If the patent has a private return, this may tip the 
balance  and  encourage  early  completion  of R&D.  Diseconomies  of scale 
and scope in R&D experiments  may, however, discourage  catch-up  by 
entrants.5 
Exogenous  uncertainty  about  the outcome  of experiments  is a feature 
of most R&D  activities. How does uncertainty  affect the possibilities  of 
R&D preemption?  Intuitively, the possibility of preemption  is greatly 
restricted. The knife edge in which a lead in R&D gives a sure win to 
the incumbent  disappears.  And while the probable  effect of early R&D 
by the incumbent  firm  is to give it an edge, the entrant  may nevertheless 
find the expected profit  from entering  the patent race higher than its 
opportunities  in other  industries.  This situation  may require  the incum- 
bent to undertake  a sufficiently  large R&D preemption  to lower the 
expected  payoff  to entrants  to a point  at which  the payoff  is less attractive 
than  alternative  opportunities.  Equilibrium  in this case will also depend 
critically  on the information  of the players. If the degree of success of 
the incumbent's  experiments  is known  to the potential  entrant,  then the 
entrant  can condition  entry  on circumstances  in which the incumbent  is 
disadvantaged.  This in turn  will force the incumbent  to take actions that 
increase  the probability  of outcomes  that  are ex post preemptive. 
A final  issue in the technology  of R&D concerns the place of patents 
and preemption  in multiproduct  markets.  One may think  of technology 
as having  the shape of a tree, with fundamental  processes as the trunk 
that  supports  the  production  of many  products,  and  specialized  processes 
as the branches  that  affect  only a few products  at the extremities.  Patents 
enhance these processes and permit  the patent holders to appropriate 
5. Some of the issues surrounding  the productivity  of long-term  contracting  for R&D 
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the resulting  returns  by monopolizing  or licensing  the production  of the 
products  affected. How will an incumbent  controlling  a technology  and 
facing  entrants  in some branches  of it deploy  R&D  effort?  Does preemp- 
tion deflect R&D effort toward  the threatened  branches?  How are the 
quality  and  cost of products  that  are not threatened  by entry  affected? 
A final constellation  of issues surrounding  contestability concerns 
cases in which R&D is socially productive, say in lowering marginal 
cost. A perfectly  discriminating  monopolist  who can appropriate  all the 
benefits  of the R&D  will make  the investment  if and only if it is socially 
desirable  (with  lump-sum  redistribution  assumed  if necessary). Suppose 
this firm  is now faced with  potential  entry. Will  R&D  in the industry  still 
come close to socially optimal  levels? The following line of reasoning 
suggests that it will not. If R&D cannot be used effectively to preempt 
entry and contestability  results, the incumbent  firm  will have difficulty 
ensuring  that  it can appropriate  the benefits  of R&D, and  thus  a reduced 
incentive  to perform  it. The point at which this occurs depends on the 
information  available  to the opponents and on the credibility  of their 
threats,  and  is unlikely  to coincide  with  the point  at which  R&D  becomes 
socially  productive.  Further,  the benefit  to an incumbent  of preempting 
entry  may  lead  to R&D  in situations  in which  it is not socially  productive, 
as in the Stiglitz model. However, if R&D is socially productive and 
limited  R&D permits  preemption,  it may nevertheless be the case that 
the existence of the potential  entrant  limits  the ability  of the incumbent 
to appropriate  its benefits,  leading  to less R&D  than  is socially optimal. 
This suggests that policies that promote  contestable market  structures 
may be very inefficient  in distinguishing  socially productive  and unpro- 
ductive  R&D. 
Sam Peltzman: I find  two ways to view this paper.  One is as an inquiry 
into the minimal  conditions  that  are logically  required  for contestability 
results. The second is as an elaboration  of things that are in practice 
likely  to cause  wedges between  price  and  marginal  cost. The author  does 
not tell me which view to take, but the paper does come across as a 
logical exercise that also purports  to say something substantial.  As a 
logical  exercise it causes few problems,  though  I think  it pushes conclu- 
sions  too far  and  begins  tripping  over itself. I have stronger  reservations, 
however,  about  its substantive  message, although  these reservations  are 
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The author's  argument  rests on the knife-edge  result about ease of 
entry in standard  theory. If prospective profits are positive epsilon, 
everybody wants to enter the market.  If epsilon is negative, potential 
entrants  will stay out. Now assume  there  are sunk  entry  costs of epsilon. 
Add  that  to a situation  of pure  contestability  and  endow the entrant  with 
a belief that competition  will be so fierce that price will fall to marginal 
cost immediately  after  entry. Epsilon  profits  are then negative  and  entry 
can  be deterred.  Importantly,  the pure  monopoly  price  can  be sustained. 
This is what was once called ruinous  competition.  It is ruinous  compe- 
tition theory written  with epsilons, but ruinous  nevertheless. Here the 
prospect  of ruinous  competition  (P < ex ante  AC) fully deters  entry  and 
supports the monopoly price. The conclusion is  that the  simplest 
sustainable  result (P  =  AC) rests on this knife edge. It does not, as 
previously  believed, recede slowly as sunk  costs become larger. 
The more general conclusion Joseph Stiglitz draws from this-one 
that has also been around  for awhile-is  the prospect  of fierce, instant, 
price-equals-marginal-cost  competition  that  can reduce  actual  competi- 
tion and, more  generally,  deter  investments  that  increase  social welfare. 
I find  nothing  objectionable  about  the particular  result  on sustainability 
or the more  general  implication  about  the potential  problems  with  price- 
equals-marginal-cost  competition. The latter is, for example, a useful 
antidote to such bromides as the undesirability  of exclusive use of 
knowledge  that appear  early in the paper  and underlie  a variety  of other 
possible situations  illustrating  the potential  welfare  gains from slowing 
down rivalry  in the short  run  to induce Pareto  superior  resource  alloca- 
tion. Examples  include  the old infant  industry  arguments  for protection- 
ism and  modern  sustainability  arguments  for entry  restriction.  All these 
cases raise doubts about how each of these restrictions  may work in 
practice.  But no case is implausible  on its face. 
The  author's  more  particular  result  on sustainability  serves as a useful 
reminder  that, because entry-exit  is one of the few areas  of theory  where 
a knife-edge  result is important,  one should not just wave one's hands 
about  continuity  results. 
If I were advising  Stiglitz's  Princeton  colleagues  to reply, it would be 
that they should say, "Well, we always wave hands at such problems; 
what is special about this one?" For example, my students sometimes 
comment, "If profits are epsilon, anybody would like to enter this 
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will be negative. So if they think ahead one step, nobody will move. 
What do you say to that?" Well, I say, "Economics is frictionless, 
except where it is inconvenient."  They are not all going to move. That 
is why you get all the nice properties  or competition. 
Toward  the end of the paper Stiglitz tries to anticipate  replies and 
needlessly overextends  himself. First, he anticipates  the rejoinder  that 
the monopoly-price  equilibrium  can  be undercut  by long-term  contracts. 
He does this by cobbling  together  a very special  model  in which  the only 
contract offered is the monopoly price. To me, that only invites a 
wasteful  competition  in theories. Immediately  I would invoke a Coase 
theorem about theories. If one model generates unexploited gains, 
another  model  will come along  with some set of deals that  realizes  those 
gains. In this case there are buyers who otherwise face the monopoly 
price forever, and potential sellers who can serve them profitably  at a 
lower  price. So one has to expect a rejoinder  in which  a deal in principle 
breaks the monopoly price, to the mutual benefit of the buyers and 
potential  sellers. 
I cannot  anticipate  what  the deal might  be. Maybe  one takes a bit of a 
buyers' coalition to underwrite  the sunk costs here, adds a dash of 
vertical  integration  there, shakes well, and that will do the trick. But I 
do not think Stiglitz should anticipate that reply, either. The proper 
response,  would  I think  go something  like this. If breaking  the monopoly 
price  requires  some gimmick  such as long-run  contracts, then sustaina- 
bility  becomes a special  case in which the transaction  costs required  for 
whatever  the appropriate  deal is are trivial. 
I have a similar  reaction  to his discussion  of response  lags. Response 
lags are not, as long-term  contracts are, an extraneous consideration 
that Stiglitz can properly ignore. They are, after all, what motivated 
Bertrand's  critique  of Cournot.  Stiglitz  ends up being palpably  uncom- 
fortable  in  dealing  with  them:  sometimes  they help  limit  monopoly  power 
and  sometimes  they do not; and  then on the next page they probably  are 
not important,  anyway. 
There  are two difficulties  with this approach.  One is theoretical.  The 
response lags here are grafted to the case arbitrarily.  Stiglitz cannot 
make  up his mind  about  exactly how arbitrarily  they ought  to be grafted 
on. Given that procedure, their role is going to remain  as fuzzy as it 
seems  to be here. Ultimately,  restrictions  on the speed of response  must 
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evaluating  the consequences  of a rival's  move. They  cannot  be arbitrary. 
More importantly,  simply dismissing  the importance  of response lags 
undercuts  the larger  message  of the paper,  with  which  I agree. Response 
lags are  just an example of a limitation  on the fierceness of postentry 
competition,  and nothing  would be lost if Stiglitz simply said, "That is 
exactly my point. Some such  friction  is often  what  is needed  for effective 
competition." 
Now, let me get to what  the point  of this  paper  might  be for how actual 
markets  behave. Here, I have to exercise some imagination  because the 
paper only hints at applications for actual behavior. One possible 
inference  is that  entry  deterrence  is in  fact important,  that  it is a pervasive 
feature  of small-numbers  rivalry  because sunk  costs are so pervasive. I 
am unaware,  however, of any convincing  evidence that  this is true, and 
my own cursory look at the data does not support the idea. One 
formulation  that  occurred  to me was, is there  less entry  the closer these 
markets  approach  monopoly?  This modification  is required  because the 
monopoly of the theory is never found in the real world except in 
regulated  markets.  In any case, I identified  the monopoly  in his theory 
with small-numbers  rivalry  and then ran down the standard  industrial 
classification.  I took the first  two high-concentration  and first  two low- 
concentration-the criterion  was a four-firm  concentration  ratio higher 
than  60  or  lower  than  20-four-digit industries  in each two-digit  industry. 
Then  I calculated  the entry  rate. Here are the results. 
High (CR > 60)  Low (CR <  20) 
100  x AlogN  4.6  (24.8)  2.0  (32.2) 
100 x A log VS  71.6 (45.0)  76.5 (28.8) 
The first row is the average log change in the number  of firms  from 
1972  to 1982.  The standard  deviation  is in parentheses.  The second row 
shows the average growth rate of value of shipments for the same 
industries.  High- and low-concentration  industries  grew about equally 
fast. So the room  for new entrants  is about the same in both segments, 
and the average  rate of entry is about the same. Also, the odds of high 
entry rates, as reflected  in the standard  deviation,  look about  the same. 
Now, nothing  so obviously  crude  can be definitive;  all I am saying  is that 
the case for strategic  entry  deterrence  in the real  world  needs to be made. 
Stiglitz  says that  it takes actual  entry  to lower price, not  just potential 
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experience  with airline  deregulation  so far suggests he is right. It does 
seem to take new entrants  to lower fares significantly.  A more indirect 
but more  thorough  test is afforded  by the main  body of the old literature 
on profits  concentration  that  also tends  to support  his  point.  But  Stiglitz's 
Princeton  colleagues  can also point  to that  literature  as supporting  some 
kind  of working  contestability  story. 
Suppose, for example, that  a highly  concentrated  industry-one  that 
has an 80 percent concentration ratio-is  subject to a flood of new 
entrants that succeed in capturing  half the large firms' business. A 
reasonably  typical profits-concentration  study would imply that, given 
this flood  of entries, price  would  fall about  5 percent. Such a conclusion 
is not  too bad  for those who support  contestability,  even though  it pushes 
in the direction  that  Stiglitz  seems to want  one to believe the world  goes. 
Or  he may  just be saying  that small-number  industries  that approach 
monopoly markets  work better because they can hope to avoid fierce 
competition.  Again, the empirical  literature  on industrial  organization 
tends to be supportive:  high  and rising  concentra.tion  seems to be asso- 
ciated with dynamically  superior  price and productivity  performance. 
But  significant  decreases  in concentration  also tend  to be associated  with 
superior  price and productivity  performance.  So the data may simply 
mean  that  great  technological  progress  upsets established  structures. 
Thus  the  broad  tenor  of the empirical  literature  is that  market  structure 
does seem to matter,  roughly  in the way suggested  by this paper, but it 
does not matter nearly as much as the barrage  of theory fired at the 
problem  would suggest. 
Nevertheless, perhaps  none of all this is germane  to the paper,  which 
can support  the negative of almost every inference I have just drawn 
from  it. Does actual  entry  lower prices?  One model says that  entry  leads 
to collusion.  Another  says it leads to wasteful  duplication  of investment. 
Does successful deterrence  of entry conduce to efficiency?  A series of 
models  suggests  it leads to the opposite-excess  capacity, overly rapid 
obsolescence,  and  so forth.  Stiglitz  may  reply-properly in  some sense- 
that each outcome is possible, although  in different  circumstances. I 
have no objection  to that. My objection is rather  that we are given no 
guidance  as to when to expect one outcome or another. 
So, my quarrel  here is not so much with this paper  as with its claim, 
early on, that a major insight of the work on industrial  organization 
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of competition are variables that will affect how firms will interact 
strategically.  It is indisputably  clear that strategic interaction  has at- 
tracted much model-building  energy in the past decade. But what has 
not been shown  is how or even whether  the strategic  considerations  that 
elicit all this energy  matter  anywhere  beyond the borders  of the models 
in which they appear. 
General Discussion 
A major concern of the conference participants  was the role the 
various  models in this paper  could have in guiding  empirical  work. The 
paper's meaning,  Robert  Willig  proposed, is that incumbent  firms  may 
sometimes  have  devices  available  to help  them  deter  entry  and  sometimes 
may not. The paper should be read as a guide to sorting out which 
circumstances  cut which  way, he suggested. 
Carl  Shapiro  argued  that  this paper  (and  the whole body of literature 
on contestability  theory)  calls attention  to two factors that are particu- 
larly  important  in  predicting  how markets  will  perform.  One  is the degree 
of sunk  costs, which determines  how hard  it is to get into the market  or 
to get back out; the other is the behavior that can be expected when 
there  is more  than  one firm  in a market.  With  the exteme assumptions  of 
instantaneous  price-cutting  (Bertrand)  competition, even small sunk 
costs are critical. The other extreme of no sunk costs and no price 
response  by the incumbent  produces  a very different  result. One role of 
the modeling  exercise, he suggested, is to study the sensitivities of the 
results  near  the extremes. 
Richard  Levin noted that efforts to discriminate  between the effects 
of these two classes of variables  have already served as the basis for 
some empirical  work on contestability. A recent study by Margaret 
Peteraf  on monopoly  airline  markets,  for example,  attempted  to measure 
the extent to which prices were driven by two sets of variables, one 
measuring  the degree of sunk costs and the other attempting  to predict 
price-cutting  behavior  on  the  basis  of past  reputations.  Similarly,  Clifford 
Winston  noted that empirical  work on airlines  has found that potential 
competition  seems to matter,  but not nearly  as much  as actual  competi- 
tion. 
Joseph Stiglitz  responded  that  the paper  was not intended  to provide 
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markets  according  to certain  kinds  of exit costs and the kinds  of ex post 
behavior those costs can be expected to produce. The models were 
intentionally  oversimplified,  with only three  or four  parameters  in each, 
he argued,  yet they produced  very  diverse  behaviors.  As a consequence, 
they provide  a framework  for sorting  out which  conditions  lead to which 
reactions. 
Timothy Bresnahan  observed that the dispute about whether the 
paper provides testable empirical  implications  is, more deeply, about 
the role of theory  in empirical  work. Theorists  should  not necessarily  be 
expected to produce empirical  hypotheses, he argued. To do so may 
require  them to be too literal-minded  to produce  good theory, while at 
the same time it encourages empirical researchers to be too literal- 
minded  in their reading  of theory. Sam Peltzman  agreed  that theorists 
should not necessarily have to produce precise empirical  predictions. 
But his criticism  was more  general,  he said, arguing  that  the whole body 
of work on strategic  interaction  has failed so far to produce  very much 
in the way of new insights despite all the resources devoted to the 
enterprise. 
Addressing  this  concern,  Winston  asked  the  participants  to summarize 
the status of the contestability  debate. Willig  suggested  that the debate 
has served  to put  the theorist  in the role  of a thoughtful  potential  entrant. 
It has forced them to consider the structural  facts of the situation,  the 
risks, and the reasonable  expectations about incumbents'  responses, 
and  then  to ask  what  kind  of price-cost  deviation  would  make  a particular 
entry  plan  look profitable.  Models such as those presented  in this paper, 
he contended,  help make  such analyses sensitive to different  conditions 
and  different  behaviors. 
Stiglitz  agreed  that the game-theoretic  modeling  approach  is essen- 
tially introspective  in that it asks what the state variables  are and how 
rational  people will behave given these variables. Seen in this light, he 
conceded  evidence that people rely on naive models of predicting  their 
rivals'  behavior,  such as looking  at their  reputations  for retaliation,  is a 
bit disturbing  for recent  theoretical  work. 
So far, Shapiro  observed,  the debate  has come down  to whether  there 
is any connection  between  prices  before  entry  and  pricing  behavior  after 
entry. If there is a strong connection, contestability theory will be 
applicable.  If there  is a weak connection,  then  potential  entrants  will not 
be able to influence  current  pricing. 